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Abstract 	
During the twentieth century a number of accounts of Lenin’s theory and 
practice argued that Leninism is incompatible with democracy. In doing so, 
various scholars advanced the now popular belief, that the theory of scientific 
socialism defended by Lenin and prevalent in the Third International is 
undemocratic. Liberal and conservative critics of socialism are not the only 
proponents of this argument. Leninism has been criticised on this basis within 
the currents of Russian Bolshevism, Left Communism and Western Marxism. 
It is for this reason that the Marxism of Lenin and the Third International has 
been rejected as dogmatic, vulgar, and positivist: few contemporary Marxists 
condone dogmatism, vulgarity, or positivism. This dissertation examines and 
rejects the claim that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is anti-democratic. It 
argues that the Leninist conception of Marxism as a science is compatible 
with democratic practice, and promotes a democratic conception of socialism.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background 	
2017 marks the hundredth year anniversary of the Russian October 
revolution, during which the Bolshevik party seized state power and began the 
construction of the world’s first communist state. Historians and political 
scientists are still discussing the causes and consequences of this 
momentous event, and a great many many controversies still surround 
interpretations of it. Despite this multitude of disagreements, scholars of the 
October revolution and the Soviet Union tend to agree that the Bolshevik party 
would not have been victorious if it were not for the visionary leadership 
provided by the communist revolutionary, politician, and political theorist 
Vladimir Lenin, for he alone thought that the objective conditions had matured 
sufficiently for a revolutionary upheaval. By combining sheer rhetorical force 
with theoretical ingenuity, Lenin singlehandedly convinced his party and the 
working class that the time for talking was over, and that the time for 
revolutionary action had arrived. In doing so, he changed the course of 
modern world history. 
 
Lenin’s influence upon political developments did not end after his death in 
1924, however, for his ideas continued to provide the theoretical, 
organisational and strategic basis for much of the worldwide socialist 
movement over the course of the twentieth century. This movement 
succeeded in bringing a third of the world’s population under the rule of 
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Marxism, and many of these Marxist states proclaimed themselves to be 
Leninist. Even today Lenin’s ideas continue to influence world politics, for the 
ruling communist parties of the remaining Marxist countries are still organised 
upon the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. It is precisely because 
Lenin’s political thought had and continues to have such a large impact upon 
politics, that an elucidation of its principles remains as relevant, as important, 
and as necessary now as it ever did. A fine-grained textual analysis is made 
even more pressing due to the fact that many of Lenin’s core concepts and 
ideas have been both misconstrued or consciously distorted by his supporters 
and critics alike.  
 
Although there are various ways of understanding Leninism, the most concise 
and succinct definition is provided by Joseph Stalin, whose lucid presentation 
of its fundamentals remains unsurpassed. In The Foundations of Leninism 
Stalin states that: 
 
Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian 
revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the 
proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in particular (Stalin 1953: 73). 
 
The first point Stalin makes is that Leninism is the direct continuation of 
Marxism, that is, the philosophical, political and economic ideas of Karl Marx 
and Frederick Engels. The second point he makes is that Leninism developed 
during the era of imperialism, a historical phase in the development of 
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capitalism when the western European nations colonised vast sections of the 
globe, resulting in world war. The third point he makes is that Leninism is the 
revolutionary theory of the working class. It describes how the workers will 
organise themselves into a revolutionary vanguard party, abolish capitalism, 
and establish the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, which is a transitory stage 
that precedes the attainment of socialism and communism. 
 
As Stalin (1953: 91) rightly points out, Leninism is not just the continuation of 
Marxism, for ‘Lenin's method is not only the restoration of, but also the 
concretisation and further development of the critical and revolutionary 
method of Marx, of his materialist dialectics’. Indeed, Lenin made important 
philosophical, political, and economic contributions to the foundations that 
were established by Marx and Engels. This dissertation focuses upon one 
contribution in particular, that is, his theory of scientific socialism. 
 
Like most of Lenin’s political ideas, the term ‘scientific socialism’ has its 
origins in the works of Marx and Engels, who coined the concept in order to 
distinguish their own ideas from those of the utopian socialists. Marx and 
Engels developed the theory of scientific socialism at a late stage in their 
intellectual development, and as a result, the concept remained in many ways 
obscure and underdeveloped. Whilst Marx made various references to his 
own scientific method, he never used the term ‘scientific socialism’, and 
Engels only provided a very general overview in his famous pamphlet, 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.  
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Lenin, however, never became acquainted with the ‘humanist’ writings of the 
‘young’ Marx, which were published for the first time after his death. The 
classical works that Lenin knew and studied were the scientific writings of the 
‘mature’ Marx, which were in turn interpreted and codified by Engels. This 
meant that the theory of scientific socialism took on a high level of significance 
from the very beginning of Lenin’s intellectual development. It gave him the 
conviction that ‘Social-Democracy bases its whole world-outlook on scientific 
socialism, i.e., Marxism’ (CW 15: 402).  
 
Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is based upon two interconnected 
doctrines, one philosophical and one sociological. In the first place, he states 
that ‘the philosophical basis of Marxism…is dialectical materialism’, the 
components of which are derived from the philosophy of science and nature 
expounded by Engels in his influential work, Anti-Duhring (CW 15: 402; CW 
14: 15, 19). Dialectical materialism states that the universe is governed by 
‘definite laws’ of nature, established by the natural sciences. Lenin argues that 
dialectics also includes ‘what is now called the theory of knowledge, or 
epistemology’, which focuses upon ‘studying and generalising the origin and 
development of knowledge, the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge’ 
(CW 21: 54).  
 
Lenin argues that the sociological basis of scientific socialism is historical 
materialism. He states that the core components of this doctrine can be found 
within Marx’s magnum opus, Capital, which is ‘the chief and basic work in 
which scientific socialism is expounded’ (CW 1: 185). In this work Marx 
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applied the cosmic laws of dialectical materialism to an analysis of social 
phenomena. In doing so, he argued that the development of society is a law-
governed process that can be ‘determined with the precision of natural 
science’ (Marx cited in CW 21: 56). In Lenin’s view, ‘historical materialism was 
a great achievement in scientific thinking’, for it ‘made it possible for the first 
time to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the 
masses, and the changes in those conditions’ (CW 21: 56). ‘The chaos and 
arbitrariness that had previously reigned in views on history and politics were 
replaced by a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory’ (CW 19: 25).  
 
‘Since the appearance of Capital’, states Lenin, ‘the materialist conception of 
history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition’. He 
goes on to argue that until another thinker comes up with a theory of 
comparative scientific rigour, ‘the materialist conception of history will be a 
synonym for social science’. The conclusion that Lenin draws from this is that 
Marxism is not only a scientific conception of history, but ‘the only scientific 
conception of it’ (CW 1: 142).  
 
Not only does Lenin believe that Marx was ‘the first to elevate sociology to the 
level of a science’ (CW 1: 140). He also argues that ‘Marxism was the first to 
transform socialism from a utopia into a science’ (CW 4: 210-11). In Lenin’s 
view, scientific socialism rejects the utopian notion that socialism can be 
established through rational argumentation and human will power alone, for 
‘In their scientific works, Marx and Engels were the first to explain that 
socialism is not the invention of dreamers, but the final aim and necessary 
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result of the development of the productive forces in modern society’ (CW 2: 
19). They showed socialism to be the inevitable outcome of an objective 
historical process, one that cannot be affected by the human will. Capitalism 
will collapse not due to the arguments and actions of a few well-meaning 
reformers, but due to its own internal economic contradictions. This means, 
according to Lenin, that the socialist movement should base itself not upon 
utopian blueprints and wishful thinking, but upon a scientific understanding of 
the objective laws of economic development. The conviction that science 
alone provides the key to human emancipation is what distinguished ‘the 
representatives of scientific socialism, Marx and his followers, from the 
utopian socialists, from the petty bourgeois socialists, from the socialist 
intellectuals and from the socialist dreamers’ (CW 27: 465). The rejection of 
utopian socialism and the defence of scientific socialism is therefore a central 
theme running throughout Lenin’s works on politics, science and philosophy.  
 
Not only does Lenin view scientific socialism as a tool for outlining the 
trajectory of the socialist movement. It also informs his ideas, arguments and 
decisions during every political situation. It would therefore not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that the doctrine of scientific socialism defines 
Leninism as a political theory. It should also come to no surprise that this 
doctrine is also one of the most controversial aspects of Lenin’s thought. 
During the twentieth century a number of accounts of Lenin’s theory and 
practice argued that Leninism is incompatible with democracy. In doing so, 
various scholars advanced the now popular belief, that the theory of scientific 
socialism defended by Lenin and prevalent in the Third International is 
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undemocratic. The most recent and sophisticated defence of this argument is 
provided by Neil Harding in his book Leninism (1996). In a chapter ominously 
entitled ‘A Philosophy of Certainty: Dialectical Materialism’, Harding outlines 
two commonly held conditions for democratic decision-making, and he then 
shows that Leninism violates both of these conditions. 
 
In the first place, it is generally thought that the correct solutions to political 
problems are uncertain in democracies. Policy decisions require ethical 
judgements, which means that there are no objectively correct answers. 
People therefore have differing views of what the best solution to a political 
problem is. Even if the ends of policy decisions can be agreed upon, there is 
usually uncertainty and conflict over how the end may best be achieved. This 
epistemic uncertainty is therefore a necessary condition for democratic 
debate, deliberation, and compromise (Dahl 1998: 71-72). 
 
In Harding’s view, Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism violates epistemic 
uncertainty because it is a monistic ‘philosophy of certainty’. Leninism claims 
to have found the objective truth through the use of science, and it therefore 
does not tolerate alternative political viewpoints. ‘Science, Leninism 
concluded, is not advanced by taking straw polls, counting heads or 
conducting elections…all problems are amenable to scientific resolution’ 
(Harding 1996: 241).  
 
A second generally accepted condition for democratic decision-making is 
political equality. In its broadest philosophical sense, political equality means 
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that all people are viewed to be intrinsically equal, and that they are treated 
with the same degree of respect (Christiano 1990: 151). In its application to 
government, political equality means that all citizens should be considered to 
be sufficiently well qualified to participate in the democratic process of 
governing the state. It also means that in the decision making process, the 
government must give equal consideration to the interests of every person 
bound by those decisions (Dahl 1998: 76, 79).  
 
According to Harding, Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism violates political 
equality because it makes an epistemic distinction between the Marxian 
intellectuals who can comprehend the scientific laws of history, and the rest of 
the population, who lack this capacity. ‘This is an ideology created wholly by 
intellectuals and…not only by them, but for them and in their interests’ 
(Harding 1996: 239). Harding argues that Leninism is committed to the 
dictatorship of an elite intellectual vanguard, which will rule during both the 
revolutionary upheaval of capitalist society, and the post-revolutionary period 
of socialist construction (Harding 1996: 241-42). This view is one that Harding 
shares with the commentators who argue that Lenin’s positivism, like any 
positivist political science, reduces politics to problems of technical efficiency 
and the dictatorship of scientific experts.	
 
Harding claims then, that Leninism rejects two conditions for democratic 
decision making- political equality and epistemic uncertainty. In doing so, he 
specifically reiterates provides the now widely held belief, that ‘the Leninist 
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metaphysic of science was, from first to last, radically at odds with democratic 
theory or practice’ (Harding 1996: 170). 	
 
Liberals and conservatives are not the only proponents of this argument. 
Leninism has also been criticised on this basis within the currents of Russian 
Bolshevism, left communism, and western Marxism, among others. As Lenin’s 
interpretation of scientific socialism provided the supreme source of authority 
in the Third International and much of the communist world, his ideas are 
often blamed for prompting the decline of Marxism into dogmatism and 
dictatorship during the twentieth century. This is a major reason as to why the 
democratic left has rejected the Marxism of Lenin and the Third International 
as dogmatic, vulgar, and positivist: few contemporary Marxists condone 
dogmatism, vulgarity, or positivism. 
Argument 
 
This dissertation does not question whether or not epistemic uncertainty or 
political equality are necessary conditions for democratic decision-making. It 
is intentionally entitled ‘Leninism, scientific socialism and democracy’ in that 
order, for the reason that it focuses upon establishing the correct 
interpretation of Leninism and scientific socialism, rather than democracy. 
This dissertation does, however, argue that Leninism violates neither 
condition. Lenin defends a fallibilist conception of science, the claims of which 
are uncertain. His view that Marxism is a proletarian science does not violate, 
but affirms the political equality of all who participate in the process of political 
4281783	
	 13	
change. Lenin’s commitment to scientific socialism is also a commitment to 
democracy. 
Structure 
 
In order to pursue this argument, Chapter two situates the question within the 
literature and establishes the unique contribution of this dissertation. Chapter 
three examines and refutes Harding’s argument that Leninism violates the first 
necessary condition for democracy, epistemic uncertainty, whilst Chapter four 
examines and refutes his charge that it violates the second condition, that of 
political equality. Chapter five summarises the argument. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the voluminous literature on Leninism, only a few studies focus upon its 
relationship with democracy. However, almost all commentaries address this 
relation to some extent, as it is virtually unavoidable in any discussion of 
Leninism as a political theory. This chapter outlines the various interpretations 
of Leninism, and shows that these interpretations determine how scholars 
assess the relationship between Leninism and democracy. These are ideal 
types only, and many interpreters of Leninism would have good reason to 
disassociate themselves in various respects from one or the other. 
Nevertheless, the general tendencies of interpretation characterised here are 
fundamental, and grasping them will make it easier to orientate this 
dissertation amongst the multitude of controversies surrounding the 
interpretation of Lenin’s writings, and their relation to democracy.  
I. Leninism as opportunism 
 
The most popular reading, which Lih (2008: 14-18; 2003: 5-49) calls the 
‘textbook interpretation’, argues that Lenin was primarily a shrewd pragmatist 
and a revolutionary practitioner, who could assess the concrete situation and 
identify its potentialities (Wilson 1972: 390). As a theorist, he was inconsistent 
and often changed his mind on many issues (Hunt 1950: 171). The scholars 
in this tradition therefore argue that theory was unimportant to Lenin, and that 
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it did not influence his political ideas (Mayo 1955: 290). It is thought that Lenin 
typically adopted a tactic without regard for the theory, and only then 
supported this tactic by referencing the Marxist classics (Plamenatz 1954: 
221; Besancon 1981: 212-42) 
 
This interpretation constructs Lenin as a skilful yet power hungry opportunist, 
and Leninism is defined as an organisational structure, one that is ruled by a 
centralised and disciplined vanguard party (Agursky 1987: 71-80). These 
commentaries argue that Leninism was one of the first ideologies of the 
modern era to recognise and harness the potential of the new means of 
mobilising and manipulating the masses (Lichtheim 1961: 325-51; Claudin-
Urondo 1975: 61-81). The grievances of all social classes were to be 
exploited and galvanised by the party’s frontline organisations (Valentinov 
1968: 64-76). This conception of Leninism supports the widespread view that 
Leninist regimes were totalitarian (Sayer 1978: 29-37). These accounts 
emphasise the states use of control mechanisms granted to them by modern 
technology, to shape and determine the ideas of the population, as well as to 
control, guide, and mobilise their activities (Conquest 1972: 34-42). Leninism 
is seen as synonymous with totalitarianism, and these accounts typically rely 
upon Lenin’s theory of party organisation outlined In What is to be Done? 
(Service 1985: 88-93). Here Lenin infamously states that the workers cannot 
develop the necessary revolutionary consciousness, and that they therefore 
need to be directed by the vanguard party. 
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II. Leninism as Jacobinism 
 
A supportive and parallel reading to the ‘opportunist’ interpretation is that the 
Leninist conception of the party and revolutionary mobilisation was the 
product of the Russian revolutionary tradition, which gave Lenin his method 
for transforming the political landscape (Ulam 1969: 108-9; Payne 1964: 30; 
Weeks 1968: 3-7; Baron 1963: 239). This tradition drew upon Jacobinism, a 
form of elitism which argued that the process of history could be shaped and 
determined by the conscious intervention of a ruthless, dedicated and 
disciplined minority, which should use terror if necessary, to accomplish their 
aims (Schapiro 1970: 4; Utechin 1964: 217; Pipes 1968: 49; Volkogonov 
1994: 5; Hook 1964: 166). Unlike contemporary European political practice, 
which had for a long time accepted the ideas and procedures of democracy, 
the Russian revolutionary tradition had no knowledge of democracy, and thus 
had no commitment to it (De George 1968: 28; Haimson 1955: 132-8; Mason 
1929: 527). In these studies, it is Russian Jacobinism, rather than Marxism, 
which defines Leninism as a theory (Daniels 1962: 86; Possony 1964: 11). 
III. Lenin as a democrat 
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a small literature has challenged the 
prevailing view of Leninism as a form of opportunism/ Russian Jacobinism, by 
arguing that Lenin was a democrat. Liebman and Colletti (1972: 219-229) 
argue that Lenin outlined an essentially democratic vision of socialism in his 
famous work The State and Revolution. They point out that Lenin envisioned 
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a system of universal suffrage and mass, voluntary participation in state 
governance that sought to emulate the Paris commune. The daily affairs of 
society were to be organised and controlled by the workers themselves, and 
the standing army would be replaced by a people’s militia. Elected 
representatives would be subject to direct recall, and all major political 
decisions would first require extensive deliberation. Liebman (1975: 191-96) 
goes so far as to suggest that the theory of democracy presented in this text 
is essentially anarchist and libertarian in nature.  
 
Other scholars have argued that Lenin’s democratic credentials can be seen 
in his theory of inner party democracy, which was itself a microcosm of the 
soviet state. In his article ‘Leninism and Democracy’ Nash (1990: 19-32) 
refutes the opportunist interpretation of the vanguard party as a monolithic 
and hierarchical organisation by showing that Lenin supported voting and 
deliberation on all political issues, including those issues that concerned the 
theoretical foundations of Marxism itself. In Nash’s view, Lenin’s infamous 
1921 ban on party factions was an emergency response to the civil war, 
rather than a timeless aspect of his doctrine. 
 
Other commentators refute the opportunist argument that Lenin sought to 
repress the spontaneous initiatives of the masses and impose the leadership 
of the vanguard party (Nistad 2010: 148). In the opinion of Trotskyists such as 
Cliff (1975: 69), Molyneux (1978: 59-60) and Le Blanc (1990: 62), Lenin 
wanted the vanguard party to lead, rather than to quash the spontaneous 
working class movement. However, as Lih points out, their defence of Lenin’s 
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democratic credentials is inconsistent, as they do not question the opportunist 
interpretation of What is to be Done? as an elitist text. They instead dismiss 
this text by arguing that it was an anomaly in Lenin’s writings, which signified 
a distinct yet temporary break from his otherwise consistently democratic 
thought. These authors ascribe to what Lih (2008: 19) calls the ‘bending the 
stick’ interpretation, the notion that Lenin held contradictory ideas that 
changed along with the political environment. Due to the fact that these 
scholars do not dispute the elitist implications of What is to be Done?, Lih is 
right in arguing that they share more in common with those who view 
Leninism as a strand of anti-democratic opportunism. To write off What is to 
be Done? as an anomaly is hardly a convincing way of showing Lenin’s 
commitment to democracy. 
 
In contrast to the Trotskyist approach, Lih’s Lenin Rediscovered:	What Is To 
Be Done? In Context (2008) is a more convincing attempt to repudiate the 
textbook interpretation of What is to be Done?. The central thrust of Lih’s 
argument is that the vast majority of scholars have fundamentally 
misinterpreted What is to be Done? because they fail to situate it within the 
historical context of Russian social democracy. Lih argues that this text was 
written not in order to denigrate the spontaneous activities of the masses, but 
instead, to celebrate it (2008: 20-21). Lenin relished in the revolutionary 
outbursts of the working class, however, he realised that a successful class 
required revolutionary leadership. Lih argues that it was actually Lenin’s 
opponents who underestimated the level of proletarian consciousness. Lih 
also analyses Lenin’s other political writings within the same period as What is 
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to be Done?, and he finds that between 1900-1903 Lenin repeatedly spoke of 
how the socialist movement was lagging behind the spontaneous proletarian 
movement.	 As for Lenin’s statement about the need to ‘divert’ the workers’ 
movement from its spontaneous path, Lih (2008: 346-53) convincingly argues 
that this was principally a rhetorical turn of phrase based on a response to 
formulations made by Lenin’s opponents. 
 
Whilst the scholars outlined above defend Lenin’s democratic credentials, 
they do so predominantly at the organisational level, in the sense that they 
focus upon Lenin’s writings on party organisation, tactics and strategy. They 
all (with Lih as a notable exception) define Leninism primarily in terms of its 
strategic aspects, and they therefore overlook its underlying theoretical and 
philosophical aspects. This has meant that some of the more fundamental 
criticisms of the relationship between Leninism and democracy remain mostly 
unquestioned.  
IV. Leninism as a philosophical doctrine 
 
The more sophisticated studies of Lenin’s political thought acknowledge that 
he was not only an intelligent strategist, organiser and leader, but a 
doctrinaire, whose ideas and actions were dictated by his commitment to 
Marxism. By applying a rigorous historical materialist analysis to Russia in 
works such as The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin sought to create an analytical framework 
with which to both understand the world and devise his political strategy 
(Harding 1977: 5; 1983: 3-5; 1976: 366-383; Lane 1981: 3-4). Marxist 
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philosophy therefore provided Lenin with his general world outlook and 
informed every decision that he made. This means that the relationship 
between Leninism and democracy can be only if his underlying philosophy is 
understood, and it is precisely this philosophical core that provides the focus 
of this dissertation.  
 
The scholars who recognise the philosophical character of Leninism are 
predominantly critical of Lenin, though, as chapters three and four make clear, 
not all of them are critics of Marxism. Philosophical commentaries highlight 
three theoretical/philosophical aspects of Leninism that are incompatible with 
democratic practice. The first aspect is Lenin’s interpretation of historical 
materialism, which argues that the political superstructure of society is 
determined by the economic base. If democracy requires require political 
equality (as most people think that it does), and if the source of power resides 
within the economic domain, then genuine democracy can only be made 
possible once the disparities in economic power have been eliminated. This 
means that the particular political system is irrelevant. What matters is not the 
political form of society, but the class that controls the means of production. In 
Leninist theory, democracy is guaranteed once the means of production are 
taken into socialist ownership. This means that the political system that 
presides over this new mode of production will be deemed to be democratic, 
no matter what form it takes. This economic reductionism is hostile to 
democracy, as all political problems are reduced to economics (Harding 1996: 
151-8; Femia 1993: 123; Hindess 1980: 40-41). 
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A second theoretical feature of Leninism that violates democracy is its 
reduction of all systemic conflicts to the class struggle. According to this line 
of thought, once the means of production are under common ownership, 
classes cease to exist. There is no longer a capitalist class that owns the 
means of production, or a subservient class of wage labourers who own only 
their labour power. In place of this antagonism there develops a homogeneity 
of interests in society and politics. Since Leninism believes that parties 
represent the irreconcilably opposed interests of different classes, the 
necessity for a multi party system disappears once socialism is attained. The 
popular will can henceforth be expressed by a single party. The end of parties 
is the end of the pluralism, which is vital for democracy (Harding 1996: 152, 
166-67; Femia 1993: 123-4; Pierson 1986: 80-83). 
VI. Leninism, scientific socialism and democracy 
 
Given the limited scope of this dissertation, the two allegedly anti-democratic 
philosophical aspects of Leninism outlined above are not addressed. It 
instead focuses upon what commentators view to be the third philosophical 
aspect of Leninism that violates democracy, that is, Lenin’s theory of scientific 
socialism.  
 
Epistemic uncertainty 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation analyses the claim that Lenin’s theory of 
scientific socialism violates the democratic condition of epistemic uncertainty. 
Some commentators argue that it was not Lenin, but Marx and Engels who 
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were the first to violate this condition. Popper (1962: 269; 1961: 3; 1963: 338-
339), for instance, accuses Marx of creating an infallible historical prophecy 
that cannot be falsified. Femia (1985), on the other hand, argues that Marx’s 
commitment to science is by definition a commitment to objective truth. The 
problem with their arguments is that they provide little textual evidence in 
support of their claim, for there is none. As Blakeley points out in his book 
Soviet Theory of Knowledge, Marx ‘wrote no work which can properly be 
called epistemological’. Aside from a few irrelevant passages in Capital, the 
‘sole comment by Marx’ on epistemology is his second thesis on Feuerbach, 
which provides an ambivalent attitude towards objective truth (Blakeley 1964: 
14). Whilst Blakeley (1964: 15) states that Engels wrote three works ‘which 
touch on questions of theory of knowledge’, the fallibilist conception of science 
put forward in these texts rejects the possibility of obtaining certain 
knowledge. Blakeley therefore argues that Lenin alone ‘must be considered 
the actual founder of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. His 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909) is the only ‘classic’ work which is 
completely devoted to theory of knowledge’ (Blakeley 1964: 16). Accordingly, 
the claim that scientific socialism is committed to objective truth can only be 
levelled at Lenin’s version of it, rather than that of Marx and Engels. 
 
The association of Lenin’s philosophy with epistemic certainty has been 
challenged, albeit indirectly, by scholars within the Trotskyist and Hegelian-
Marxist traditions (THM), who distinguish between two distinct phases of 
Lenin’s philosophical development. The first phase is the pre-1914 Lenin who 
wrote Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. In this work Lenin is accused of 
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defending a ‘copy theory of reflection’, which states that human knowledge is 
a direct and accurate reflection of the real external world. Lenin’s crude, non-
dialectical conception of knowledge saw objective truth as being obtainable, 
and it gives credence to the claim that scientific socialism violates epistemic 
uncertainty. However, after ‘rediscovering Hegel’ by reading his Science of 
Logic in 1914, Lenin developed a dialectical understanding of the world and 
human knowledge. Lenin allegedly discarded the copy theory of reflection in 
his Philosophical Notebooks, where he states that human knowledge reflects 
nature only approximately (Anderson 1995: 71-72; Dunayevskaya 1971: 168, 
171; 1973: Ch. 3; Sheehan 1993: 135; Joseph 2002: 45). 
 
The THM interpretation analyses Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks mainly in 
terms of its effect upon Lenin’s political practice. It argues that whereas the 
vulgar Lenin of the pre-war period accepted the quietest evolutionary politics 
of the second international, the post war Hegelian Lenin adopted an activist 
politics of revolutionary action (Anderson 1995: xiv). This dissertation 
contributes to this literature by instead linking Lenin’s Philosophical 
Notebooks to a defence of epistemic uncertainty. 
 
One problem with THM interpretation is that its distinction between a dogmatic 
pre 1914 Lenin and a non-dogmatic post 1914 is both unsatisfactory and 
unconvincing. It is unsatisfactory because it agrees with Lenin’s critics that his 
pre-1914 works were dogmatic, and it therefore condemns a large proportion 
of his works. Chapter three argues that this concession is unnecessary. 
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The THM interpretation is unconvincing because it erroneously claims that 
Lenin discarded the vulgar materialism of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism 
after 1914. This view is evidently wrong, as Lenin chose to publish a second 
edition of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in 1920, six years after he wrote 
his Philosophical Notebooks, which was not published until five years after his 
death. In the preface to the second edition Lenin states that this work was re-
published in order to provide the definitive outline of Marxist philosophy: 
 
With the exception of a few corrections in the text, the present edition 
does not differ from the previous one. I hope that…it will prove useful 
as an aid to an acquaintance with the philosophy of Marxism, 
dialectical materialism (CW 14: 21). 
 
Contrary to the THM interpretation, the textual evidence suggests that Lenin 
never rejected the ideas of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. On the 
contrary, he always believed that this work provided the definitive account of 
his philosophy. This dissertation deals with this problem by arguing that 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in fact defends a fallibilist conception of 
science. This text is not the quintessential work of ‘vulgar Marxism’ that the 
THM interpretation makes it out to be. 
 
Another problem with the THM interpretation is recognised by one of its more 
sophisticated proponents, John Rees. Whilst Rees (1998: 189) believes that 
Lenin did deepen his understanding of Marxism during the war, he argues that 
the THM approach underestimates the extent of continuity in Lenin’s ideas. 
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Although Rees rightly highlights the continuity between Lenin’s pre and post 
1914 philosophical works, he still ascribes to the notion that there are two 
distinct phases of Lenin’s philosophical development. 
 
The THM attempt to set up the dogmatic Lenin of Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism against the anti-dogmatic Lenin of his Philosophical Notebooks, for 
the purposes of criticising the former and praising the latter, is a sterile 
pursuit. It sheds light neither on an understanding of the development of 
Lenin’s writings, nor the vices and virtues. This dissertation dismisses the 
notion of a pre and post 1914 Lenin. It instead argues that Lenin’s fallibilist 
and anti-dogmatic conception of science can be found not just in his post 
1914 works, but in many of his works on science and philosophy. Lenin did 
not in fact ‘deepen’ his understanding of Marxism and become less dogmatic 
in 1914, as this ‘understanding’ in fact existed from the very beginning of his 
intellectual development.  
 
Political equality 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation analyses the claim that Lenin’s theory of 
scientific socialism violates political equality. The scholarship on scientific 
socialism and political equality draws many of its ideas from the literature that 
discusses the relationship between technocracy and democracy. A political 
system is technocratic if it involves governance by un-elected and 
unaccountable experts known as technocrats (Meynaud 1968: 31). These are 
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individuals with technical training and occupations who exercise governmental 
authority by virtue of their scientific knowledge (Gunnar 2006: 56-81).  
 
Most scholars see the relationship between technocracy and democracy as a 
zero sum game. Whilst democracy means rule by the people (demos), 
technocracy means rule by an elite of (technical) experts. Whilst democracy is 
committed to political equality, technocracy is committed to political inequality. 
It is therefore generally thought that higher levels of technocracy mean lower 
levels of democracy, and vice versa (Fischer 1990). However, It is also 
generally acknowledged that most democratic systems do contain some form 
of technocratic expertise, as the term ‘technocratic’ is often used to describe 
democracies that include non-elected professionals at the ministerial level 
(Fischer 2000). Furthermore, the theoretical literature suggests that some 
degree of technocratic expertise is necessary in modern democracies, not 
only due to the size of modern societies, but also due to the increasingly 
complex problems that political leaders face (Dahl 1998: 78-9). However, 
most scholars recognise that an important distinction can be made between 
democracies with technocratic elements on the one hand, and technocracies 
with few or no democratic elements on the other (Dahl 1998: 71). The latter 
system is usually associated with the classical positivist philosophy of science 
developed by Comte and Saint-Simon (Ball 1984: 239-40). Classical 
positivism proclaims that both the natural and social worlds are governed by 
ahistorical causal laws. Knowledge of these laws also grants the ability to 
predict events. The reason for this is that to explain a phenomenon is to cite 
the causal antecedents required to produce or prevent it. The ability to predict 
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events therefore grants the power to control events. It is not a democratic 
citizenry, however, which is to direct these affairs, for they lack the requisite 
scientific knowledge. Only the technocratic experts who understand the laws 
of society can rule. The classical positivist conception of technocracy 
therefore entails a non-democratic system of governance in which decision 
makers are selected on the basis of their technological knowledge. Scientists, 
engineers, technologists, or any experts in any field, would compose the 
governing body, instead of elected representatives. Leadership skills would be 
selected on the basis of specialised knowledge and performance, rather than 
parliamentary skills. Diversity of opinion and criticism cannot be allowed in the 
positivist technocracy, for it may allow people who lack the necessary 
knowledge to change society, with disastrous results. In order to prevent this 
from happening, all criticism must be suppressed (Fay 1975: Ch. 1-3).  
 
Much of the controversy in the literature on classical scientific socialism and 
democracy concerns its relationship with positivism. On the one hand, some 
scholars argue that Marx was a positivist, and that he is therefore responsible 
for the authoritarianism of Lenin (Habermas 1971: 102-112; 1972: 36; 
Wellmer 1974: 67- 87; Hayek 1955). Others argue that it was not Marx, but 
Engels, who developed the positivist version of scientific socialism that led to 
dogmatism and dictatorship (Thomas 1976: 2; Ball 1984: 241; Farr 1984: 223-
24). Others yet argue that Engels defends a sophisticated version of scientific 
socialism that rejects positivism (O’Neill 1986; 1996; Sheehan 1993: 45-6).  
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Although the relationship between classical scientific socialism and positivism 
is contested, chapter four shows that there is little disagreement when it 
comes to Lenin, whose unique epistemological contributions to the doctrine 
are often described as positivist. This dissertation contributes to the literature 
by arguing that Lenin rejects positivism. He does not think that only the expert 
few can understand science, and he does not think that scientific knowledge 
grants control over events. 
 
This dissertation is framed as a response to Harding not because his 
arguments are unknown, non-representative, and therefore easy to refute. On 
the contrary, Harding occupies an authoritative position in the literature on 
Leninism, not only because he has written voraciously on the subject, but 
because he also provides one of the most charitable and sympathetic 
interpretations of Lenin’s thought. In one of his earlier articles, ‘Lenin and his 
critics: Some problems of interpretation’, Harding (1976) rejects the deluge of 
ideologically prejudiced and hostile interpretations of Leninism that had 
emerged since the beginning of the cold war. Harding instead argues that 
Lenin was in many ways an original, intelligent and rational doctrinaire who 
made valuable contributions to the Marxist tradition. Harding expands upon 
this theme in his subsequent two-volume study, Lenin’s Political Thought, 
(1977, 1983) which gives a detailed account of Lenin’s intellectual 
development. The first volume (1977) deals with Lenin’s political thought in 
the pre 1914 period, which is a period that other scholars tend to neglect or 
skip through. Harding correctly recognises that some of Lenin’s most 
important theoretical contributions to Marxism were made during this time. 
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Useful insights in this volume include a detailed analysis of Lenin’s largely 
understudied text, the Development of Capitalism in Russia, which Harding 
convincingly views to be his magnum opus. In both of these volumes Harding 
convincingly argues that Lenin was an orthodox Marxist, whose thought was 
informed by a sophisticated Marxist analysis. 
 
Harding’s most recent work, Leninism (1996), provides an overview of the 
Leninist doctrine, and is essentially the synthesis and culmination of his prior 
ideas on Lenin. Whilst this book is more critical than his previous work, it 
provides the definitive account of Lenin’s political thought, and his theory of 
scientific socialism in particular. Since Harding’s arguments against scientific 
socialism are comprehensive, they deserve to be answered in detail by a 
focused study. 
 
The second reason for focusing upon Harding’s account is that of the few 
commentaries that recognise the importance of philosophy in Leninism, few 
have found it necessary to undertake a detailed exegesis of the relevant texts. 
Harding’s book, on the other hand, dedicates an entire chapter to an analysis 
of Lenin’s philosophy of science, dialectical materialism, which is unparalleled 
in terms of its detail and sophistication. This factor makes Harding’s book 
particularly relevant to this dissertation. His arguments for the epistemic 
certainty and elitism of Leninism provide a ready-made peg on which to hang 
the argument that Lenin’s conception of science is committed to epistemic 
uncertainty and political equality. 
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Finally, Harding provides the most recent, sophisticated and comprehensive 
analysis of Leninism, which manages to synthesise all of the main points that 
have been made against it by prior studies. By focusing upon Harding’s 
arguments, this dissertation can avoid becoming unnecessarily cumbersome 
by making too many detailed references to the writings of others who have put 
forward the same points before him.  
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this dissertation refutes Harding’s specific arguments against 
Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism. In doing so, it does not refute everything 
that Harding has to say on Leninism. On the contrary, many of Harding’s 
arguments, such as his belief in the centrality of Marxist philosophy in 
Leninism, are convincing. This dissertation is therefore not a polemic against 
Harding, but an answer to his polemic against Lenin’s doctrine of scientific 
socialism. The purpose is to make it clear what Lenin actually argues, in order 
to show that his conception of Marxism as a science supports a democratic 
understanding of socialism. 
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Chapter 3: Leninism, scientific socialism, and 
epistemic uncertainty 	
Do not debase our revolutionary science to the level of mere book 
dogma, do not vulgarise it.  
-  Lenin, New Tasks and New Forces (CW 8: 218). 
Introduction 	
Democratic systems are founded upon the belief that the correct solutions to 
political problems are uncertain (Hazenberg 2015: 45). This uncertainty arises 
because decisions about policies require ethical, rather than scientific 
judgements, which means that there are no objectively correct answers in 
politics (Przeworski 1991: 13; Innerarity 2013: 10). People therefore have 
differing views of what the best solution to a political problem is (Estlund 1993: 
75). Even if the ends of policy decisions can be agreed upon, there is usually 
uncertainty and conflict over how the end may best be achieved (Kelsen 
1948: 911; 1964: 65-66). This epistemic uncertainty is therefore a necessary 
condition for democratic debate, deliberation, and compromise (Dahl 1998: 
71-72).  
 
Harding argues that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism violates epistemic 
uncertainty because it is a monistic ‘philosophy of certainty’. Leninism claims 
to have established objective truth through the use of science, and it therefore 
does not tolerate alternative political views. There is no need for deliberation, 
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voting, or a multi-party system, if one thinks that science provides objectively 
‘correct’ answers to political questions.  
 
The first section of this chapter outlines Harding’s argument for the epistemic 
certainty of Leninism. It shows that this argument has been put forward not 
only by Lenin’s liberal critics, as it has its origins in the currents of Russian 
bolshevism, left communism and western Marxism. Section two rejects this 
charge by arguing that Lenin’s fallibilist conception of science dismisses the 
possibility of obtaining certain knowledge. Section three highlights Lenin’s 
belief that philosophical ideas must be continually revised in light of new 
discoveries in the natural sciences. It then shows that Lenin highlights the 
particular fallibilism of the social sciences, with the purpose of opposing 
dogmatism in socialist debate. Section four argues that Lenin’s attitude 
towards the utopian socialists can be misunderstood if it is interpreted as the 
total rejection of their views. Lenin advocates utopian dreaming as a remedy 
to dogmatic tendencies in Marxism. 
 
This chapter concludes by arguing that Lenin’s scientific socialism is wrongly 
conflated with ‘scientistic’ socialism. This association sustains the mistaken 
belief that that people must choose between either ‘humanist’ socialism, 
which is committed to democratic values, or scientific socialism, which rejects 
the validity of ethical values altogether. This is a false choice that does not 
have to be made. Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism does not entail a 
scientistic outlook. It is compatible with the democratic principle of epistemic 
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uncertainty. Lenin’s writings on the philosophy of science are not the founding 
documents of Marxist dogmatism that they are often portrayed to be. 
I. Dialectical materialism as a ‘philosophy of certainty’ 
 
In Harding’s view, one of Lenin’s most influential contributions to the doctrine 
of scientific socialism was his attempt to ‘vindicate the contention of 
materialism that objective truth was attainable- that it was indeed the one 
essential condition of human progress’ (Harding 1996: 222). Whilst Harding 
provides little textual evidence for his argument, he claims that Lenin 
distinguishes between subjective knowledge, which is public opinion, and 
objective knowledge, which is the domain of science. Lenin supposedly 
argues that subjective knowledge is incomplete and inadequate. It can only 
grasp the appearance of things, it is disjointed, and it cannot not generalise. 
The scientific dialectical method, on the other hand, can delve beneath the 
surface appearance of all phenomena and uncover their internal 
contradictions. This ability to penetrate into the true nature of objects 
facilitates the transition from subjective to objective knowledge. Lenin 
therefore believes that the dialectical method transcends mere opinion and 
provides absolute truth. ‘Lenin insisted that objective truth, indeed absolute 
truth, was attainable’ (Harding 1996: 224, 231).  
 
Harding highlights the anti-democratic implications of Lenin’s philosophy of 
science by first considering the democratic implications of its obverse, 
epistemic uncertainty. He argues that if the existence of objective truth were 
denied, people would have varying views of nature, society and politics. 
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People would not oppose debate and deliberation about these matters, and 
they would likely encourage the proliferation of divergent views. People would 
demand democratic procedures and institutions that respect and protect the 
diversity of opinion. These rules would likely apply to a wide range of areas, 
including electoral procedures, political parties, and parliament. This 
democratic system would allow a plurality of groups to propose different aims, 
policies and goals that society should pursue, as well as the manner in which 
they are pursued (Harding 1996: 240-41).  
 
According to Harding, Lenin’s belief that objective truths can be discovered in 
political affairs violates epistemic uncertainty. Those who disagreed with 
Lenin’s infallible scientific proclamations would not be protected, but would 
instead be viewed as enemies of the state, for ‘there is only one proletarian 
philosophy and one bourgeois philosophy’. Allowing mistaken views to be 
expressed in public debate would be too dangerous, as the undue credence 
they may receive would in turn undermine the ‘authority of science and the 
integrity of the proletarian idea’. According to Harding (1996: 241), ‘this 
conception of truth, and the path to its attainment, not only has no need for 
the dense network of rules, conventions and forbearances regarding toleration 
and protection of dissenting voices’, for it ‘must see them as being misguided, 
if not actually harmful. Science, Leninism concluded, is not advanced by 
taking straw polls, counting heads or conducting elections’ On the contrary, 
‘all problems are amenable to scientific resolution’ (Harding 1996: 241). 
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What is meant by this, according to Harding, is that in the same way that a 
mathematical formula provides the correct answer to a scientific question, 
Leninism believes that the dialectical method can correctly answer all political 
questions, for if people correctly apply dialectical method to an analysis of any 
question, they will all arrive at the same answer. According to Harding, Lenin 
argues that the laws of the dialectic highlight the correct path to take during 
both the revolutionary struggle and the post revolutionary period of socialist 
construction. This all embracing philosophy can provide objectively correct 
answers to any and all questions, whether they are of a scientific or a political 
nature. In this way, Leninism seeks to eliminate the ‘anarchy of opinion’ that 
characterises the democratic process (Harding 1996: 241). 
 
In Harding’s view, Lenin’s claim to have discovered objective truth explains 
his increasing intolerance of inner party debate and his ‘contempt for “politics”’ 
in general: ‘For Leninists, proper science speaks with one voice. Its status and 
repute are diminished by dispute. It is a body of demonstrable truths’ (Harding 
1996: 241): 
 
The contention that all phenomena of the natural and social worlds are 
amenable to scientific exploration that would yield objective and 
verifiable propositions about their nature, led easily to the conclusion 
that for any given problem, only one solution was scientifically 
possible...Science…would be devalued and discredited by permanent 
debate and dissension. The monolithic nature of the party, 
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therefore…derived from, and was certainty sustained by, the bogus 
certainties of dialectical science (Harding 1996: 274). 
 
Harding argues that Lenin’s belief in objective truth has dire consequences 
not only for inner party democracy, but also for democracy in general, for 
‘since that truth was a single and unique truth, procedural means had to be 
arrived at whereby unanimity of outcome could be guaranteed’ (Harding 1996: 
170-71). Factions would be banned, no rival platforms would be tolerated, and 
contested elections would be seen as counterproductive (Harding 1996: 214). 
Keepers of the orthodoxy would make their decisions seem as if they were 
taken unanimously, and supported unanimously by all who it affected. 
Decisions made by the leading bodies, such as the state and party, would be 
unanimously adopted, and these decisions would be binding upon all lower 
bodies. Harding believes that ‘the whole justification for…the pervasive 
Leninist style of unanimity in decision-making, derives from its philosophical 
starting point’ (Harding 1996: 242).  
 
Harding argues that when Leninist states encourage or permit open debate 
outside and inside the party, and when they defend or tolerate the rights of 
dissenting voices, they thereby begin to undermine the ‘Leninist conception of 
the party as the bearer of science and truth’. Such actions could only take 
place if they ascribed to a relativist conception of truth, which would contradict 
and undermine the metaphysical foundations upon which the party’s claim to 
power is founded. It was this gradual acceptance of open debate, according to 
Harding, which explains the collapse of the Soviet Union. ‘In no other modern 
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ideology was the relationship between metaphysical principle and actual 
power relations so intimate’ (Harding 1996: 242). He argues that ‘there was 
never any room within Lenin’s world-view for a genuine principled and 
continuing debate between different, but equally authentic, formulations of the 
proletarian mission’ (Harding 1996: 169). Leninism, in Harding’s view, is a 
monistic science, and has but one voice. Its status would only be diminished 
by democratic dispute. It is a ‘philosophy of certainty’, a body of absolute 
truths (Harding 1996: 241).  
 
Harding provides the latest and most sophisticated reiteration of an argument 
that has been put forward more bluntly by the various cold war critics of 
Leninism. The sovietologist Bochenski, for instance, (1963: 30) argues that 
Lenin created an original epistemology that ‘affirms the existence of absolute 
truth’. As a result of this, ‘Lenin does not seek to understand whether Marxism 
is true; he would rather find out wherein lies the disloyalty of those whom he 
attacks; i.e. wherein they deviate from established truth’ (Bochenski 1963: 
49).  
 
In agreement, the sovietologist Boselager argues that Lenin’s philosophy is 
characterised by a ‘supercilious and dogmatic self-assurance’, which holds 
that his own proofs and assertions are ‘irrefutable and uniquely true’.  He 
rejects the arguments of his critics without attempting to see how their 
positions can be interpreted, understood and criticised objectively and 
soberly. Boselager concludes that Lenin’s philosophy of science is to blame 
for the development of party dogmatism (Boselager 1975: 32-33). 
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Kolakowski echoes the same line of argument. In his view, Lenin belief that 
Marxism provides ‘ready-made’ answers to all major questions rejects the 
utopian socialist notion that dreaming about the future is an integral 
component of politics. Fantastical visions of the future society are subjective 
and therefore false, in Lenin’s view. Real science is objective, which means 
that the structure of socialist society and the means of obtaining it can be 
discovered scientifically, rather than through debate. In Kolakowski’s (1978: 
728) view, Lenin’s vision of a totalitarian regime that would engulf all aspects 
of political, economic and social life is served well by his philosophy, for it is 
‘not concerned with investigating and solving problems but with imposing a 
dogmatic intellectual system on the socialist movement’.  
 
In agreement, Jordan (1967: 357) argues that Lenin was ‘bound to present 
the fundamental assumptions of the Marxian doctrines as incontrovertible 
truths, as clear as noonday, as self-evident as one’s own existence’. Lenin 
views Marxism to be ‘the foundation of truth, the basis of certainty’ (Jordan 
1967: 361).  
 
The Marxologist Wolfe states that Lenin’s thought is so dogmatic that his 
ideas bear more of a similarity to religion than to science. He states that 
Leninism is a ‘deeply emotional faith…the party born of that ism makes its 
dogmas the test of truth’ (Wolfe 1965: 357, 358). Meyer (1957: 298) takes the 
same line by insisting that Leninism is ‘a secular religion; and the social 
scientist should criticise it not for being secular, but for being a religion’.  
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Liberals and conservatives are not the only thinkers who accuse Lenin’s 
theory of scientific socialism of violating epistemic uncertainty. This claim has 
its origins in the Marxist tradition. The earliest to criticise Lenin were his 
immediate opponents within his own Bolshevik party, Bogdanov, Bazarov and 
Yushkevich, who published their views of Lenin’s philosophy in their jointly 
written work, Pillars of Philosophical Orthodoxy. Yuskevitch in particular 
accuses Lenin of a dogmatic self-assurance and an inability to understand 
anyone’s views accept his own. Yushvekitch also criticises Lenin’s ignorance 
of science, the coarseness of his language, his inability to write, and his 
factual errors (1910 cited in Sheehan 1993: 141).  
 
The left communist Pannekoek also criticises Lenin’s dogmatism in his book 
Lenin and Philosophy. Pannekoek argues that Lenin misrepresented and 
unfairly dismissed the ideas of his philosophical opponents in a bid to 
establish his own interpretation of Marxism as an infallible creed (1975: 8).  
 
One of the principle founders of western Marxism, Karl Korsch, echoes the 
same argument as Pannekoek in an even harsher form. Korsch argues that 
Lenin’s philosophy is corrupted by his partisan politics. Lenin supposedly 
views dialectical materialism to be the only genuine revolutionary theory, 
which can be protected against the weakening influences of other theoretical 
tendencies only by excluding the revisions made necessary by scientific 
research and criticism. Lenin avoids discussing the merits of new scientific 
theories and concepts on the basis that they endanger the militant character 
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of his revolutionary materialist philosophy. Leninism therefore not only 
promotes the instant dismissal of rival theories, for it also supports their active 
suppression (Korsch 1975: 117). In a later article, ‘An anti-critique’, Korsch 
defends his earlier criticisms of Lenin and restates them in a more explicit 
form. He argues that Lenin’s theory of dialectical materialism stands above 
the sciences as a kind of absolute legal authority for judging the latest 
discoveries of the individual sciences, past, present and future. He claims that 
this procedure was taken to absurd lengths by subsequent Leninists, who 
created a special kind of intellectual domination over all the sciences, as well 
as over the arts (Korsch 1970: 137). 
 
In this narrative of Lenin’s scientific socialism as the foundation stone of 
dogmatism and totalitarianism, the text that is most often cited as evidence is 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Kolakowski provides a typical summary, 
stating that In this ‘crude and amateurish’ book, in which Lenin subjects his 
opponents to ‘unbridled abuse’, ‘cheap mockery and invective’, ‘Engels’s 
arguments are vulgarised and turned into cut-and-dried catechetical forms’ 
(Kolakowski 1978: 721-27). In Kolakowski’s view, Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism is important not for its philosophical contributions, for which it made 
none, but for its role in promoting a dogmatic politics. When writing it, Lenin 
had no intention of reforming, supplementing, or enriching Marxism. Nor was 
he attempting to answer any profound philosophical questions, as in his view, 
these had already been solved by Marx and Engels. Lenin instead thought 
that pluralism was a direct political danger, and so the book was necessary in 
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giving the revolutionary movement a uniform, clear-cut ‘Weltanschauung’ 
(world view) (Kolakowski 1978: 723). 
 
The western Marxists of the Frankfurt school also criticise the dogmatism of 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. In an unpublished article Horkheimer 
(1987: 184) argues that Lenin makes the same mistake as the Machian 
philosophers he criticises, namely, he juxtaposes his own inadequately 
justified and dogmatic views against the ungrounded dogmatic views of his 
opponents, instead of taking up an elevated position, and overlooking these 
dogmatic views from elevated heights. Horkheimer’s view is shared by his 
collaborator Adorno (2008: 37), who states that Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism ‘remains a thoroughly dogmatic work which simply presents a 
specific thesis with a torrent of abuse and in endless variations, without at all 
attempting a fundamental explanation’. 
 
In the opinion of Lenin’s critics, it was not just in the theoretical realm that 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism fostered dogmatism. Kolakowski points out 
that after the October revolution this text became an obligatory subject of 
study in the Soviet Union. In doing so, it had a decisive influence upon the rise 
of dogmatism and authoritarianism within the Marxist movement. Kolakowski 
(1978: 727) emphasises the practical impact of this text, stating that ‘It had a 
deplorable effect in furnishing pretexts for the stifling of all independent 
thought and in establishing the party’s dictatorship over science’. The same 
argument is put forward by Hunt (1950: 212), who states that Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism swiftly became ‘the standard of intellectual orthodoxy’ within 
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the Third International, any departure from which was seen as a betrayal of 
the revolutionary movement, as were divergences on questions of party 
tactics and strategy. 
 
Wolfe states that Materialism and Empirio-Criticism claims to give the correct 
answers to all philosophical, scientific and political questions, and that it 
therefore became the bible of the communist movement. Its infallible 
proclamations were used as a form of ‘quotational shock treatment and chain 
reaction’ to link up and destroy all forms of oppositional, dissenting and 
independent thought. It was used as a ‘thread to guide the faithful through the 
labyrinth of modern science and philosophy’. Lenin’s proclamations promoted 
a ‘quasi-religious fanaticism’, and it eventually created a ‘state philosophy or a 
state faith, the faith of a state relentless, irreconcilable and omnipotent in 
enforcing the answers’ (Wolfe 2001: 516-17). 
 
This affirmation of both the theoretical and practical importance of Materialism 
and Empirio-Criticism is also confirmed by various soviet sources. The editors 
preface to the Collected Works edition proudly proclaims that ‘this work has 
become a model of irreconcilable, party struggle against the enemies of 
dialectical and historical materialism’ (CW 14: 11), and in the introduction to 
the German and English standalone editions, the soviet philosopher Deborin, 
who was briefly the official interpreter of Lenin’s philosophy, exalts the 
importance of this work for the final victory of true Marxism over all reformist, 
anti-Marxist trends. In Deborin’s view, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism not 
only made important philosophical contributions, for it also settled the inner 
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party struggle, strengthened the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, and 
determined the subsequent development of philosophical ideas in Russia 
(Deborin cited in Pannekoek 1975: 8). The Stalinist politician Zdanov is even 
more blunt, arguing that the Russian Communist Party’s ‘violence and 
intolerance’ towards dissenting ideas was directly inspired by ‘Lenin’s book, 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, where every word hits the enemy like an 
annihilating sword stroke’ (Zdanov cited in Bochenski 1963: 48). 
 
The popular claim reiterated by Harding then, is that Lenin’s theory of 
scientific socialism violates the epistemic uncertainty of the democratic 
process. This argument has become well established despite the fact that its 
proponents often provide little to no textual evidence in support of it. This 
suggests that it was probably the historical practice of Leninist regimes, rather 
than Lenin’s actual writings, which has convinced commentators that Lenin’s 
ideas entail a dogmatic and intolerant politics. In any case, the supposed 
epistemic certainty of Leninism is one of the main reasons as to why it has 
been disregarded as vulgar and dogmatic by the democratic left: No modern 
Marxist endorses dogmatism or vulgarity. The remainder of this chapter 
submits these arguments to the test of a fine-grained textual analysis, and it 
finds that they have no basis. 
II. Lenin, Popper, and fallibilism 
 
A popular myth in the philosophy of science is that fallibilism began with 
Popper. Prior to Popper’s contributions, the philosophy of science was 
blemished by dogmatism and inductivism. According to the inductivist view of 
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science, scientific knowledge began with observations, followed by the 
proposal of a modest law that generalised the observed pattern. For example, 
the singular observation that the sun rose on Sunday morning would support 
the universal claim that the sun will rise every morning. This meant that a 
single observation could establish the existence of universal laws in nature. 
Inductivism led to dogmatism, since it was seemingly capable of showing that 
scientific theories could be proven true. Popper then solved the problem of 
induction by arguing that whilst there are no valid arguments that can 
extrapolate singular observations into universal laws, there are ways to reject 
these laws by showing examples that contradict them. Whilst no arguments 
can show that single statements can become universal laws, there are valid 
arguments that can falsify such statements. This solution to the problem of 
induction became known as the fallibilist account of science, and it became 
the foundation of the best introductory texts to the philosophy of science 
(O’Neill 1996: 51-2). Fallibilism argues that the scientific process entails the 
development of a hypothesis, which is then refuted by subsequent findings. 
Contemplate the following description of the growth of scientific knowledge: 
 
Cognition is the eternal, endless approach of thought to the object. The 
reflection of nature in man’s thought should not be conceived as being 
‘dead’, as being ‘abstract’, without movement, without contradictions, 
but as in an eternal process of movement, the inception of 
contradictions and their solution (CW 38: 195). 
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This Popperian sounding passage is from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks. It 
was written in 1914, long before Popper wrote his first work. Whilst Harding 
acknowledges Lenin’s fallibilist pronouncements in his Philosophical 
Notebooks, he gives three reasons as to why they should be dismissed. In the 
first place, he points out that Lenin’s ‘1914 reflections were private 
ruminations, not intended for publication; they did not see the light of day until 
1928-9. Until that time, they were simply not in the public domain’. Harding 
(1996: 234) concludes from this that they ‘can therefore hardly count as 
elements of Leninism as ideology’. The problem with this argument is clear: 
the fact that Lenin never published his Philosophical Notebooks provides no 
proof that he rejected the ideas contained within them, nor does it justify 
dismissing them as irrelevant. Many works by famous political thinkers were 
unpublished during their time, yet they are still held to be important by modern 
scholars. Lenin’s ‘private ruminations’ should be treated no differently. 
 
Harding’s second argument targets the content of the text itself, which 
consists of a set of scattered pronouncements and telegraphic one-liners. He 
degrades their value by claiming that Lenin’s remarks are discontinuous, that 
they are hard to ‘disentangle’ from those of Hegel, and that they take the form 
of either ‘summaries or cryptic comments at a high level of abstraction’. 
Harding supports his argument by pointing out that there are only five pages 
of continuous narrative in the Philosophical Notebooks- Lenin’s essay On the 
Question of Dialectics, which was intended to be part of a larger study on 
dialectical materialism (Harding 1996: 234). Again, however, the argument 
that the structure of a text is disjointed provides no compelling reason to reject 
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the ideas within it. Historians and political scientists regularly analyse 
documents of various types with jumbled structures. They are often held to be 
no less important than published material. 
 
Harding’s third argument is that Lenin intentionally chose not to publish the 
fallibilist ideas contained in the Philosophical Notebooks for political reasons. 
They were ‘too explosive…too critical of his own ‘vulgar-materialist’ standpoint 
of five years previously’. The ideas contained in this work threatened the 
notion of objective truth and introduced a relativist element into Marxism that 
could undermine its claim to certainty. For these reasons, Harding argues, 
Lenin suppressed them (Harding 1996: 237). The problem with this argument 
is that the political reasons that Harding outlines are purely speculative, and 
they cannot be proven via a textual analysis. 
 
Even though Harding provides no convincing arguments as to why the 
pronouncements contained within Lenin Philosophical Notebooks do not 
provide compelling evidence of his fallibilism, this text is in fact unnecessary, 
for Lenin defends a fallibilist conception of science in many of his other major 
writings on the philosophy of science. As Zizek points out, this fallibilism 
permeates the book that is widely thought to showcase the epistemic 
certainty, theoretical orthodoxy and dogmatism of scientific socialism, 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: 
 
in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism…what are Lenin’s basic 
theses?...the infamous “theory of reflection”…coupled with the 
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insistence of the precarious nature of our knowledge (which is always 
limited, relative, and “reflects” external reality only in the infinite 
process of approximation). Does this not sound familiar? Is this, in the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytical philosophy, not the basic position of 
Karl Popper, the archetypal anti-Hegelian? (Zizek 1997). 
 
Zizek unfortunately offers no argument or textual evidence in support of this 
claim. Zizek’s stance is also inconsistent, as in a later article, ‘A plea for 
Leninist intolerance’, he contradicts his earlier position by suggesting that 
Lenin’s belief in objective truth is incompatible with democratic values:  
 
Lenin's wager…is that…its universal truth can only be articulated from 
a thoroughly partisan position; truth is by definition one-sided. This, of 
course, goes against the predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a 
middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests (Zizek 2002: 
550). 
 
Although Zizek’s contradictory interpretation of Lenin’s philosophy undermines 
his overall position, he correctly identifies the Popperian content of 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Lenin’s Engelsian conception of science in 
this infamous text does in fact defend a critical and open enquiry:  
 
“Now we come to the question,” Engels writes in Anti-
Dühring…“whether any, and if so which, products of human knowledge 
ever can have sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth”. 
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And Engels answers the question thus: “The sovereignty of thought is 
realised in a number of extremely unsovereignly-thinking human 
beings; the knowledge which has an unconditional claim to truth is 
realised in a number of relative errors; neither the one nor the other 
[i.e., neither absolutely true knowledge, nor sovereign thought] can be 
fully realised except through an endless eternity of human existence” 
(CW 14: 134). 
 
Whilst Lenin’s fallibilist conception of science is certainly similar to that of 
Popper, Zizek is mistaken in thinking that they are identical. In the first place, 
Lenin and Popper develop their ideas from different philosophical starting 
points. In the second place, Lenin’s account is more convincing than 
Popper’s. A comparative analysis of their respective doctrines can show why 
this is the case. 
 
Although Popper was not the first to establish fallibilism, he did create the 
version of the doctrine that became hegemonic within the philosophy of 
science during the later decades of the twentieth century. Thus, to reiterate in 
more detail the account told earlier, Popper’s fallibilism is distinguished by his 
philosophical scepticism, which informs his account of the problem of 
induction. According to this account, a single observation of nature taken at a 
specific time and place cannot establish the existence of a universal law, as if 
the same observation were taken at a different time or place, the results could 
be different. For instance, a single observation of the sun rising on Monday 
does not prove the universal statement that the sun will rise every morning. 
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This is because there may be no uniformity in nature. The laws of the natural 
world may change across time and space. Popper concludes that single 
observations cannot establish the existence of causal laws (Popper 1972: 7).  
 
Popper claimed to have solved the problem of induction by arguing that 
science requires not induction, but deduction, according to which a single 
observation can falsify a universal statement. For instance, the observation of 
a black swan would disprove the universal statement that all swans are white. 
Popper’s fallibilism argues that science proceeds via the formation of a 
hypothesis, which is then subjected to rigorous tests. If the test falsifies the 
hypothesis, then it must be replaced by a new hypothesis, which will itself be 
subjected to tests. According to this account, scientific knowledge develops 
not through successful predictions, but through failed predictions (Popper 
1972: 27). 
 
Various scholars in the philosophy of science have shown that Popper’s 
sceptical account of the problem of induction is fatally flawed, for whilst 
Popper claims to reject the uniformity of nature, he actually presupposes it for 
two reasons (Keuth 2005: 114). In the first place, Popper believes that 
repeating the same test indefinitely is not a valid way of falsifying a law. Once 
a theory passes the same test so many times, there is little value in 
continually repeating these tests. His belief that repeated tests give 
‘diminishing returns’ must, however, assume that nature is uniform. If Popper 
did believe that changes in time and space influence the truth of a theory, 
then there would be no reasons for him to believe that repeated tests give 
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diminishing returns, and it would be a rational strategy to repeat the same test 
indefinitely (O’Neill 1989: 124). 
 
Secondly, If Popper did not believe that nature is uniform, then if theory a (Ta) 
passes tests that theory b (Tb) fails, then there would be no reason to believe 
that Ta should be preferred over Tb in the future. However, scientists do 
prefer Ta over Tb precisely because the success of Ta in it’s given place and 
time is presumed to carry over to other places and times. If the uniformity of 
nature is denied, then there are no reasons to believe that an un-falsified 
theory should be preferred over falsified theories in future events (Salmon 
1967: 26).  
 
If scientists strictly adhered to Popper’s deductivist methodology, then every 
generally accepted scientific theory existing today would have been rejected 
in their infancy. All of the best scientific theories encountered observational 
claims that were inconsistent with them. Nevertheless, those theories were 
not rejected, and it is fortunate for science that they were not. Science, 
understood as a fallible, critical and rational mode of enquiry, therefore 
requires and does assume a degree of uniformity in nature (Chalmers 1982: 
66). 
 
Not only does Popper fail to solve the problem of induction. His belief that the 
problem is at the core of the rational nature of scientific enquiry contributed to 
the rise of postmodernist relativism and scepticism in the philosophy of 
science, in addition to the irrational modes of argument they foster (Stove 
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1982: 52; O’Neill 1996: 54). Science cannot and does not develop according 
to the philosophical principle of sceptical relativism any more than people do 
in their daily lives. Popper fails to identify the important distinction between his 
own abstract philosophical scepticism, which employs a set of criteria that no 
claim can meet, and really existing practical scepticism, which evaluates 
particular scientific propositions according to the widely agreed-upon views of 
the scientific community. It is for these reasons that Popper’s fallibilism has 
been widely discredited. 	
Lenin’s philosophy of science is founded not upon Popper’s irrational 
philosophical scepticism, but upon his theory of dialectics, which is, in his own 
words, ‘the doctrine of the relativity of the human knowledge’ (CW 19: 24). 
Lenin’s account of dialectics is dispersed throughout his political and 
philosophical writings, and as such, its primary components cannot be 
discerned in a straightforward manner. An examination of this theory is, 
however, worth the effort, for whilst dialectical materialism is often 
characterised as a dogmatic pseudo science, it in fact contains a rational core 
that sheds light on the fallible nature of the sciences.  
 
Like Popper, Lenin rejects the inductivist approach to science, for he points 
out that the development of scientific knowledge is characterised by ‘the 
abrupt break-down of old established concepts’ (CW 14: 305). Thus, Lenin 
argues, theories in biology, chemistry and physics are constantly falsified, ‘for 
with each step in the development of science new aspects are discovered’ 
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(CW 14: 129). He believes that ‘both this world and these laws are fully 
knowable to man but can never be known to him with finality’ (CW 14: 189). 
 
Lenin’s critique of inductivist accounts of science is not, however, based upon 
Popper’s scepticism concerning the uniformity of nature. He criticises 
‘fashionable bourgeois scepticism’ for its ‘tendency to despise generalisations’ 
and ‘hide from the “laws” of historical development’. Lenin instead believes 
that there is a degree of uniformity in nature, and that some truths are 
therefore beyond reasonable doubt (CW 14: 155). He points to the success of 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory in order to show that a few single observations 
do not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting a universal law out of hand: 
 
Take, for example, the law of the variation of species and of the 
formation of higher species from lower ones. It would be very cheap to 
designate as a phantom the generalisations of natural science, the 
already discovered laws (accepted by all despite the host of seeming 
contraventions and deviations shown in the medley of individual 
cases), and the search for corrections and supplements to them. In the 
field of natural science, anyone who said that the laws governing 
phenomena in the natural world were phantoms would be put into a 
lunatic asylum, or simply laughed out of court (CW 20: 201). 
 
Whilst Lenin therefore recognises a degree of uniformity in nature, he rejects 
the notion that human knowledge can be certain, for he states that ‘in the 
theory of knowledge, as in every other sphere of science, we must think 
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dialectically’. This means that ‘we must not regard our knowledge as ready-
made and unalterable’. Lenin instead views the growth of knowledge to be an 
endless process, in which people gradually gain a more accurate picture of 
the world. People ‘must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, 
how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact’ 
(CW 14: 103). 
 
Although Lenin believes that human knowledge is forever relative and 
incomplete, he still argues that it is important to recognise the existence of 
objective truths, which exist independently of human knowledge. His purpose 
is not, however, to establish the epistemic certainty of Marxism. Lenin’s 
argument is that if the existence of objective truth were denied, then there 
would be no commonly accepted standards by which to judge the validity of 
scientific theories by. This could in turn lead to the resurgence of old, absurd 
and potentially reactionary beliefs. Relativism would therefore make the 
socialist movement vulnerable to forms of dogmatic assertion and religious 
irrationalism, the propositions of which are immune from the principles of 
rational debate. ‘From the standpoint of naked relativism one can justify any 
sophistry; one may regard it as “conditional” whether Napoleon died on May 
5, 1821, or not’. It would endorse the ‘tolerance…of the dogmas regarding 
sprites, hobgoblins, Catholic saints, and the like’ (CW 14: 137, 128). By 
rejecting Popper’s sceptical relativism in favour of dialectics, Lenin (CW 14: 
136) instead argues that ‘the limits of approximation of our knowledge to 
objective, absolute truth are historically conditional’. That is, ‘each step in the 
development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the 
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limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, 
now shrinking with the growth of knowledge’ (CW 14: 135). This position 
acknowledges the generally progressive character of scientific knowledge, 
whilst keeping it open to future revisions and modification: ‘by following the 
path of Marxian theory we shall draw closer and closer to objective truth 
(without ever exhausting it)’ (CW 14: 143). The purpose of this dialectical 
conception of relative and absolute truth is, in Lenin’s view, to safeguard the 
socialist movement against claims to certainty. It aims to ‘prevent science 
from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming 
something dead, frozen, ossified’ (CW 14: 136). 
 
What Lenin grants to Popper’s critique of induction is that the observation of 
regularities is insufficient in proving the existence of causal relationships: ‘the 
simplest truth obtained in the simplest inductive way is always incomplete, for 
experience is always unfinished.	Ergo: the connection of induction with…the 
relativity of all knowledge’ (CW 38: 180). However, Lenin’s concession to 
Popper’s scepticism forms part of his attack on empiricist accounts of science. 
It does not rule out the existence of universal laws in nature or the possibility 
of knowing them. His purpose is to show that the existence of causal 
relationships cannot be proven through the observation of regularities. Lenin 
argues that causal relations and the scientific knowledge resulting from them 
can be established only by ‘practice, experiment and industry’ (CW 14: 170). 
Moreover, it is ‘precisely (and only)’ by repeating these activities ‘a thousand 
million times’ that objective knowledge can be established (CW 38: 216). 
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Lenin’s critique of induction has been reiterated by the critical realism of Roy 
Bhaskar (1989). Scientific knowledge does not develop by observing 
regularities in nature. The natural world is an open system, which means that 
the majority of events that take place within it are not naturally occurring 
regularities, nor are they always available for observation. Almost every event 
in the natural world is created by a combination of multiple causal 
mechanisms, and they are characterised by hardly any regularities (CW 21: 
54). Only the controlled conditions created by experiments can attempt to 
investigate and isolate the particular causal relationships that operate in 
nature. Experiments do this by constructing closed systems that try to remove 
or minimise the influence of unwanted external factors. The problem of 
establishing a completely closed system through experimentation provides the 
foundation of Lenin’s fallibilist account of science.  
 
Lenin proceeds from the assumption that the universe is a single 
interconnected totality, in which all objects are connected with other objects. 
He argues that ‘if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look 
at and examine all its facets, its connections and “mediacies”’. Lenin 
introduces his fallibilism by arguing that a complete examination of all these 
connections ‘is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the 
rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity’ (CW 
32: 94). 
 
One reason as to why the interconnectedness of nature prohibits the 
discovery of objective truths, in Lenin’s view, is that it is impossible to ensure 
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experimental closure. He argues that experiments are able to establish 
regularities only under specific controlled conditions. The moment a scientific 
truth established through an experiment is applied to more general 
phenomena, this truth loses its objective status, and will likely be falsified. 
Accordingly, Lenin argues that the notion of ‘truth’ in science can never 
become a universal concept. He illustrates this point by drawing upon Engels’ 
discussion of experiments in Anti-Duhring: 
 
“Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar 
opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field…As 
soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that 
narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and 
therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if 
we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find 
ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become 
transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth”. 
Here follows the example of Boyle’s law (the volume of a gas is 
inversely proportional to its pressure). The “grain of truth” contained in 
this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, 
is a truth “only approximately” (CW 14: 134-35). 
 
Lenin refers to Boyle’s law in order to show the limited applicability that any 
law has outside specific controlled conditions. It states that the pressure and 
volume of a gas have an inverse relationship. If the volume of gas increases, 
then its pressure decreases, and vice versa. However, this law only holds 
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when the temperature is held at a constant. The law therefore only holds true 
under specific controlled conditions, wherein the temperature remains the 
same, and wherein the external variables can be controlled. Lenin uses this 
example in order to show that no laws can be established as universal truths 
for all time and spaces. The causes and effects at work in small-scale 
experiments and observations cannot be directly transferred to larger 
environments, where the interconnections are innumerable and even harder 
to establish: 
 
Engels particularly emphasises the dialectical view of cause and effect: 
“And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions 
which only hold good in their application to individual cases, but as 
soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection 
with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they 
become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and 
reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so 
that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice 
versa”. Hence, the human conception of cause and effect always 
somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of 
nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or 
another aspect of a single world process (CW 14: 156). 
 
The problems involved in obtaining non-revisable knowledge through 
experimentation are not, for Lenin, of a purely practical nature. He argues that 
it is impossible in principle. The various conditions that can influence the 
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result of an experiment cannot be controlled because they are infinite in 
nature. The kind of infinity that Lenin has in mind is the infinite number of 
properties in nature, which can never be exhausted by scientific knowledge. 
‘Nature is infinite, just as its smallest particle (including the electron) is infinite’ 
(CW 14: 312). 
 
Lenin argues that the infinity of the variety of properties in nature takes two 
forms. In first place is a qualitative infinity, in the sense that all objects contain 
an infinite number of qualities: ‘A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder 
and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities 
or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them’ (CW 32: 93). In the second 
place, he argues that there is a quantitative infinity. All objects can be divided 
an infinite number of times, hence his belief that ‘the atom can be explained 
as resembling an infinitely small solar system’ (CW 14: 260). In Lenin’s view, 
every particle in nature is inexhaustible in the sense that there is always 
another level of understanding to obtain. This infinite diversity of properties in 
nature prohibits infallible knowledge of the natural world: ‘Human thought 
goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first 
order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end’ (CW 
38: 251-2). 
 
For Lenin, the process of experimentation can never obtain final knowledge of 
any phenomena, and it contains no guarantees against error. The sorts of 
tests that people can devise are not final tests. The claim to know about 
something is not to say that this knowledge is finally certified as either true or 
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complete, for the methods of investigation and test generally preclude such 
finality. This means that any proposition put forward regarding the ‘laws’ 
governing nature and society, are always open to criticism, modification and 
rejection. Lenin’s conception of dialectics prohibits any theoretical proposition 
from ossifying into dogmatic assertions. Lashing out against mistakes in this 
regard, Lenin states that ‘The criterion of practice’, i.e. scientific empirical 
study and investigation, ‘can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or 
refute any human idea completely. This criterion too is sufficiently “indefinite”	
not to allow human knowledge to become “absolute”’ (CW 14: 142-43) 
Lenin’s critique of scientific inductivism is a variant of what Popper calls the 
logical problem. It concerns the problems associated with attempting to use a 
fixed number of single observations in order to prove a universally valid claim, 
when the quantifier ranges across a domain of infinite size. However, whilst 
Popper views the infinity of the realm of natural processes, objects and events 
only in terms of their spatial and temporal location, Lenin understands it in 
terms of their infinite number of properties.  
 
Although Lenin’s belief in the infinite properties of the natural world may be 
challenged on scientific grounds, his basic argument, that the impossibility of 
obtaining experimental closure provides the origins of fallbillism in science, is 
convincing, and is certainly more convincing than Popper’s. The problem of 
induction in science is not Popper’s scepticism regarding the uniformity of 
nature, but the interconnectedness and variety of the natural world that Lenin 
identifies. Lenin’s account of the problem of induction also provides a more 
convincing explanation than Popper as to why experiments are undertaken 
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and repeated. Efforts to limit the variety of properties in nature constitute the 
rational for controlling and repeating experiments. Scientists attempt to 
achieve experimental control not in order to check the effects of place and 
time, but in order to limit the amount of external variables that can affect the 
results. Scientists repeat experiments not in order to obtain more cases for 
inductive inference, but to ensure that previous experiments were adequately 
controlled. Scientists conduct new experiments in order to investigate 
scientific hypotheses in untested conditions, rather than in different places 
and times. The problem of induction in science is the interconnectedness and 
variety of the natural world that Lenin identifies. Interestingly enough, in his 
short article ‘Lenin and Popper’, Colletti (1996: 51) recalls how, in a private 
letter from 1970, Popper wrote that ‘Lenin’s book on empiriocriticism is, in my 
opinion, truly excellent.’ 
III. Lenin’s fallibilist conception of philosophy and social science 	
Harding is not unaware of Lenin’s fallibilism, for he admits that Lenin’s theory 
of dialectics ‘reminds ourselves that knowledge is always incomplete and, 
dare one say it, relative’ (Harding 1996: 224). Harding is, however, unwilling 
to admit that this undermines his argument, for he asserts that Lenin’s 
pronouncements on the relativity of scientific knowledge are ‘confusing 
qualifications’ that have no bearing upon his philosophy. It is therefore only by 
rejecting the relevance of Lenin’s fallibilism that Harding is able to maintain his 
argument that dialectical materialism is a dogmatic ‘philosophy of certainty’. 
Harding’s entire argument depends upon a single passage from Materialism 
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and Empirio-Criticism that supposedly showcases Lenin’s intolerance in 
philosophical matters: 
 
From this Marxist Philosophy, which is case from a single piece of 
steel, you cannot eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, 
without departing from objective truth, without falling prey to bourgeois-
reactionary falsehood (CW 14: 326) 
 
Even if Harding is right in his assertion that Lenin’s fallibilist conception of 
science is not related to his philosophy, his argument is still unconvincing on 
its own terms. In the first place, if the above quotation is analysed in isolation, 
it can be interpreted in a way that supports Harding’s claim. If it is analysed in 
its textual surrounding, however, then it becomes clear that it is not 
compelling evidence. Directly before this passage Lenin outlines what he 
views to be the sole ‘objective truth’ underlying Marxist philosophy, namely, 
the materialist proposition that matter existed prior to, and independent of 
human thought, which provides ‘at best an approximately true’ reflection of 
developing matter (CW 14: 326). This objective truth is, however, little more 
than a general common-sense truism, rather than a specific political platform. 
Lenin’s philosophy purposefully leaves room for a variety of different points of 
view, and it can hardly provide the basis for a dogmatic politics. 
 
Aside from the fact that Harding’s only piece of textual evidence is 
unconvincing, he also overlooks other passages in Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism that explicitly defend a fallibilist conception of philosophical 
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knowledge. In chapter four for instance, Lenin argues that ‘Marx, Engels and 
J. Dietzgen did not worry about the elementary truths of materialism, which 
had been cried by the hucksters in dozens of books’. During the historical 
period in which the founders of scientific socialism developed their 
philosophical ideas, they were principally concerned with keeping their own 
theories open to further revision and modification. They ‘devoted all their 
attention to ensuring that these elementary truths should not be vulgarised, 
should not be over-simplified, should not lead to stagnation of thought’ (CW 
14: 243). 
 
Lenin’s philosophy is particularly influenced by the ideas of Joseph Dietzgen, 
a working class autodidact who ‘arrived at dialectical materialism, i.e., Marx’s 
philosophy, independently’ (CW 19: 80). Dietzgen’s work is generally 
recognised for defending the epistemic uncertainty of dialectical materialism 
(Pannekoek 1906: 28). It is therefore significant that in an article 
commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death, Lenin praises 
Dietzgen’s emphasis on the fallibilism of materialist philosophy and the 
relativity of human knowledge. During a time when ‘simplified, vulgarized 
materialism was most widespread’, Dietzgen ‘laid his greatest stress on the 
historical changes that had taken place in materialism, on the dialectical 
character of materialism’. He emphasised ‘the need to support the point of 
view of development, to understand that all human knowledge is relative’ (CW 
19: 80). 
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The fatal flaw of Harding’s argument, however, is his unsubstantiated 
assertion that Lenin’s theory of scientific knowledge is unrelated to his 
philosophy. This claim is simply incorrect, for in the preface to the second 
edition of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism Lenin (CW 14: 21) states that the 
purpose of his book is to elucidate ‘the philosophical conclusions from the 
recent discoveries in natural science’. Like Marx, Engels and Dietzgen before 
him, Lenin believes that a genuinely scientific philosophy should base its 
propositions not upon metaphysical speculation, but upon the findings in the 
natural sciences. Since Lenin’s (CW 14: 185) fallibilism recognises that ‘the 
teachings of science on the structure of matter, on the chemical composition 
of food, on the atom and the electron, may and constantly do become 
obsolete’, he argues that the propositions of dialectical materialism should be 
revised in accordance with these new discoveries: ‘Engels says explicitly “with 
each epoch making discovery even in the sphere of natural science [“not to 
speak of the history of mankind”], materialism has to change its form”’. 
Accordingly, ‘a revision of the “form” of Engels’ materialism, a revision of his 
natural-philosophical propositions is not only not “revisionism,” in the accepted 
meaning of the term, but, on the contrary, is demanded by Marxism’ (CW 14: 
251). 
 
As Stalin (1953: 93) rightly points out, ‘it is well known that none other than 
Lenin accomplished this task (That is, the task of updating materialism) for his 
own time in his remarkable work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism’. In 
Chapter five Lenin analyses what he calls ‘The recent revolution in natural 
science’, which was a historical period in the late 19th and early 20th century in 
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which the discovery of x-rays, electrons, and the beginning of quantum 
mechanics, challenged not only the scientific conception of matter, but the 
philosophical conception as well. Many scientists during this period thought 
that matter was disappearing, and that this in turn undermined the foundations 
of philosophical materialism. 
 
In Lenin’s view, the ‘crisis in modern physics’ did mean a crisis for the old 
‘mechanical’ materialism. The belief that the universe consisted of an 
immutable material substance formed the basis of the mechanistic view of the 
world, and the foundations of this view had been undermined by these new 
discoveries (CW 21: 54). However, whilst Lenin maintained that mechanical 
definitions of matter were becoming obsolete, the dialectical concept of matter 
was not, it was simply expanding. For dialectics held that ‘the only 
immutability is the reflection by the human mind…of an external world existing 
and developing independently of the mind.’ In Lenin’s view, ‘no other 
“immutability,” no other “essence,” no other “absolute substance,” in the sense 
in which these concepts were depicted by the empty professorial philosophy, 
exist for Marx and Engels.’ He argues that the ‘“essence” of things, or 
“substance,” is also relative; it expresses only the degree of profundity of 
man’s knowledge of objects’. Thus, in Lenin’s view, certain properties of 
matter that were thought to be absolute, immutable, and primary, had now 
been proven to be relative, mutable, and characteristic only for particular 
forms of matter. What was happening, was that human knowledge was 
penetrating more deeply into the structure of matter and discovering new 
forms of matter in the process, and would continue to do so. Mechanical 
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materialism had been superseded, but dialectical materialism had not; it was 
developing to a higher stage (CW 14: 260-61; CW 19: 24). Thus whilst he 
notes that ‘yesterday the profundity of this knowledge did not go beyond the 
atom, and today does not go beyond the electron and ether’, the new 
materialism, incomparably richer than the old, recognised the ‘temporary, 
relative, approximate character of all these milestones in the knowledge of 
nature gained by the progressing science of man’ (CW 14: 262). 
 
By arguing that even the natural sciences are fallible, and by then stressing 
the dependency of Marxist philosophy upon findings in the natural sciences, 
Lenin undermines the strategy of proclaiming absolute truths in the 
philosophical sciences by appealing to such truths in the natural sciences. His 
emphasis upon the inseparability of natural science and philosophy therefore 
reinforces the epistemic uncertainty of Marxism.  
 
Lenin also highlights the unique obstacles to objective truth in the social 
sciences, which make them more fallible than the exact natural sciences. The 
purpose of his argument is to emphasise the inevitability of error in socio-
political analysis, and to therefore oppose dogmatic tendencies in the Marxist 
movement.  
 
Whilst Lenin acknowledges that the exact natural sciences deal with 
predominantly non-sentient matter, he recognises that the social sciences 
deal with conscious beings who make their own history (CW 1: 159). He 
therefore believes that the degree of uniformity within the social world is lower 
4281783	
	 66	
than in the natural world. In contrast to the laws of physics and chemistry, 
which display a significant degree of uniformity over time and space, Lenin 
argues that economic laws change in accordance with the development of 
history: ‘Marx rejects the very idea that the laws of economic life are one and 
the same for the past and the present. On the contrary, every historical period 
has its own laws’ (CW 1: 167). Lenin also believes that ‘earlier economists 
misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the 
laws of physics and chemistry’. In his view, ‘a more thorough analysis shows 
that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or 
animals’. This high degree of variation in social phenomena makes the social 
sciences significantly more fallible than the natural sciences (CW 1: 167). 
 
Lenin argues that the historical sciences are particularly fallible, as whilst ‘the 
development of world history as a whole follows general laws’, the events 
under observation rarely repeat themselves with the same consistency as 
natural phenomena. This means that ‘it is by no means precluded, but, on the 
contrary, presumed, that certain periods of development may display 
peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this development’ (CW 33: 
477). 
 
In Lenin’s view, another insurmountable obstacle to certain knowledge in the 
historical sciences is that the evidence on past social structures and events is 
often non-existent, inaccessible, or limited. He argues that this poses unique 
problems for the materialist conception of history, which relies upon empirical 
economic evidence in order to prove the relation between base and 
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superstructure. ‘Lack of factual material made it impossible to apply this 
method to an analysis of certain very important phenomena in ancient 
European history—for instance, that of gentile organization’, which, as a 
result, ‘remained a riddle’ (CW 1: 150). 
 
Even when the historical data is available, Lenin argues that its sheer volume 
cannot be assimilated by a single mind, and the historian is often forced to 
limit the scope of their argument. In his review of Kautsky’s book, A Short 
Course of Economic Science, Lenin mentions the authors considerable yet 
non-exhaustive use of references, before commenting that ‘It would be 
impossible to outline, in any course, no matter how extensive, all the data of 
modern science on all periods of economic development and on the history of 
economic views from Aristotle to Wagner’ (CW 4: 50).  
 
In Lenin’s view, the unique epistemological problems of the historical sciences 
prohibit the attainment of non-revisable knowledge in this sphere. He 
therefore rejects ‘that most banal and vulgar accusation’, that ‘The Marxists 
profess the immutability of an abstract historical scheme’. In Lenin’s view, ‘no 
Marxist has ever regarded Marx’s theory as some universally compulsory 
philosophical scheme of history’ (CW 1: 192). Like Engels before him, Lenin 
opposes the socialist Duhring, who, ‘on the most complex questions of 
science in general, and of historical science in particular…scattered words 
right and left: ultimate, final and eternal truth’ (CW 14: 133). In Lenin’s view, 
the only truths that can be established in the historical sciences are mundane 
facts and trivialities that cannot be used in the service of a dogmatic politics: 
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“Napoleon died on May 5, 1821,” says Engels…explaining to Duhring what 
one who claims to discover eternal truths in the historical sciences has to 
confine himself to, what “platitudes” he has to be satisfied with’ (CW 14: 132). 
 
Lenin believes that it is political science, however, that exhibits the greatest 
level of fallibilism. Political science inherits all of the problems of the other 
social and natural sciences, whilst possessing unique problems of its own. In 
the first place, whereas natural scientists can predict when natural events will 
occur with a high level of precision and accuracy, Lenin argues that such 
predictions are impossible in the more ‘difficult and complex science’ of 
revolutionary politics, where the complexity of events precludes the possibility 
of accurate forecasting (CW 27: 198). In his view, anyone who attempts to 
predict the fall of capitalism radically overestimates their level of knowledge, 
for whilst ‘It is natural for children to “understand” science to mean something 
that can determine in what year, spring, summer, autumn or winter the 
“collapse must begin”’, he states that these are ‘ridiculous, vain attempts to 
ascertain what cannot be ascertained’	(CW 27: 327). 
 
Secondly, whilst various natural phenomena occur through a predictable and 
regular sequence of events, Lenin argues that the same degree of uniformity 
cannot be achieved in politics, where the sequence of future events cannot be 
known in advance. He argues that this is especially the case during 
revolutionary periods, which are particularly hard to discern and predict: ‘To 
say “a revolution has taken place in one country, so now it must take place in 
Germany”—is false reasoning. There is a tendency to form an order of 
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sequence, but this cannot be done’. In Lenin’s view, it is impossible to know 
‘whose turn it will be, when it will take place, and with what degree of success’ 
(CW 24: 267).  
 
Lenin’s clearest expression of his epistemic uncertainty regarding the 
trajectory of political development can be found in the preface to the second 
edition of The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Here he states that 
societies are complex organisms that can develop in an innumerable number 
of potential directions: ‘infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this or 
that type of capitalist evolution are possible’. He concludes from this 
uncertainty that it is impossible to predict with certainty which direction society 
will take:  
 
In a revolutionary epoch, life in a country proceeds with such speed 
and impetuosity that it is impossible to define the major results of 
economic evolution in the heat of political struggle…How this struggle 
will end, what the final result of the first onset of the Russian Revolution 
will be—it is at present impossible to say (CW 3: 34). 
 
Lenin concludes from this that he did not want to update his work with any 
rash assertions that overstepped the boundaries of the historical period, 
stating that ‘the time has not yet come…for a thorough revision of this essay’ 
(CW 3: 34). 
 
Lenin’s arguments for the particular fallibilism of the political and historical 
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sciences should be emphasised for two reasons. In the first place, the 
challenges he highlights impose significant epistemic limitations on claims to 
certainty in the social sciences. The degree of experimental closure 
obtainable in the natural sciences cannot be achieved in the political and 
historical sciences. Furthermore, the transient character of social events and 
structures makes it impossible to investigate them with the techniques of non-
experimental science. The problems that Lenin highlights are genuine 
obstacles to certainty in the historical and political sciences that make them 
inherently more contentious than the more precise exact sciences. 
 
In the second place, the political conclusions that Lenin draws from the unique 
epistemological problems of the social sciences highlights how far his theory 
of scientific socialism is opposed to the epistemic certainty, dogmatism, and 
intellectual orthodoxy that it is commonly accused of generating. The aim of 
his hierarchy of epistemic certainty is to undermine the strategy of applying 
the uniform laws of the natural sciences to the non-uniform, complex and 
changeable laws of the social sciences. Lenin argues that ‘the whole attempt 
is worthless from beginning to end’, for he states that ‘the concepts 
“selection”, “assimilation and dissimilation” of energy, the energetic balance, 
and so on and so forth, when applied to the sphere of the social sciences, are 
empty phrases’. In Lenin’s view, ‘an enquiry into social phenomena and an 
elucidation of the method of the social sciences cannot be undertaken with 
the aid of these concepts’. Whilst he recognises that ‘nothing is easier than to 
tack an “energeticist” or “biologico-sociological” label on to such phenomena 
as crises, revolutions, the class struggle and so forth’, he argues that there is 
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nothing ‘more sterile, more scholastic and lifeless than such an occupation’ 
(CW 14: 328). 
 
Lenin’s purpose in stressing the epistemic uncertainty of the historical and 
political sciences is to emphasise the importance of openness and tolerance 
in political debate. The impossibility of gaining final knowledge of economic 
and historical laws guards against the adoption of a non-revisable political 
programme. Thus whilst he believes that ‘history as a whole, and the history 
of revolutions in Particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more 
Multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best 
parties’, he believes that ‘In politics it is even harder to know in advance which 
methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in certain future 
conditions’ (CW 31: 95-6). During revolutionary periods in particular Lenin 
argues that it is ‘natural and inevitable that there should emerge “a revaluation 
of all values”, a new study of fundamental problems, a new interest in theory, 
in elementals, in the ABC of politics’ (CW 17: 42-43).  
 
Whilst Lenin’s fallibilist conception of political science opposes dogmatism, it 
would be wrong to go further and argue that the political programme of 
scientific socialism contains no fundamental principles. In his article Our 
Programme, for instance, Lenin rejects the ‘revisionist’ politics of Bernstein 
and his followers on the basis that they violated these principles. He argues 
that their ideas contributed ‘absolutely nothing. Not by a single step have they 
advanced the science which Marx and Engels enjoined us to develop’ (CW 4: 
211). Lenin is aware of the political implications of this position, for he 
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immediately anticipates the ‘flood of accusations’ that it could bring. ‘The 
shouts will rise that we want to convert the socialist party into an order of “true 
believers” that persecutes “heretics” for deviations from “dogma,” for every 
independent opinion’ (CW 4: 211). Lenin’s summary of these ‘trenchant 
phrases’ is that ‘there is not a grain of truth or sense in them’, for he argues 
that a successful revolutionary movement requires a unified revolutionary 
theory. The most persuasive point that he makes, however, is that ‘to defend 
such a theory, which to the best of your knowledge you consider to be true, 
against unfounded attacks and attempts to corrupt it is not to imply that you 
are an enemy of all criticism’. He goes on to state that: 
 
We do not regard Marx’s theory as some thing completed and 
inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the 
foundation stone of the science which socialists must develop in all 
directions if they wish to keep pace with life (CW 4: 211). 
 
Lenin goes on to argue that ‘an independent elaboration of Marx’s theory is 
especially essential’ for all socialists, for ‘this theory provides only general 
guiding principles’, which must be applied differently in accordance with the 
peculiar characteristics of each particular country (CW 4: 212). Lenin puts 
forward a similar argument in his article Uncritical Criticism. Here he states 
that the commitment to fundamental principles should not mean a 
commitment to dogmatism. ‘Let us not believe that orthodoxy means taking 
things on trust, that orthodoxy precludes critical application and further 
development, that it permits historical problems to be obscured by abstract 
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schemes.’ In Lenin’s view, Marxists are not required to subscribe to any belief 
without reason, and they should not accept any formulation as so authoritative 
that it cannot be modified or rejected as the result of discussion. ‘If there are 
orthodox disciples who are guilty of these truly grievous sins’, says Lenin, 
then ‘the blame must rest entirely with those disciples and not by any means 
with orthodoxy, which is distinguished by diametrically opposite qualities’. He 
goes on to say that ‘to accept anything on trust, to preclude critical application 
and development, is a grievous sin; and in order to apply and develop, “simple 
interpretation” is obviously not enough’ (CW 3: 630). 
 
Lenin repeatedly states that Marxism is not a body of ready-made answers, 
but a scientific method that should be used to inform an independent and 
subjective analysis of society (CW 13: 427; CW 12: 363; CW 31: 71; CW 28: 
217; CW 24: 43). In his view, the dialectical method highlights the complex, 
unpredictable and non-linear character of historical development, and this 
means that Marxism must revise itself in accordance with this development. 
Lenin argues that the propositions of scientific socialism therefore need to be 
as temporary as the social phenomena it reflects. This fallbilism forms the 
introduction of his article, Certain Features of the Development of Marxism: 
 
Our doctrine—said Engels, referring to himself and his famous friend- 
is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This classical statement stresses 
with remarkable force and expressiveness that aspect of Marxism 
which is very often lost sight of. And by losing sight of it, we turn 
Marxism into something one-sided, distorted and lifeless; we deprive it 
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of its life blood; we undermine its basic theoretical foundations-
dialectics, the doctrine of historical development, all-embracing and full 
of contradictions; we undermine its connection with the definite 
practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with every new turn of 
history…It is precisely because Marxism is not a lifeless dogma, not a 
completed, ready-made, immutable doctrine, but a living guide to 
action, that it was bound to reflect the astonishingly abrupt change in 
the conditions of social life (CW 17: 39-42). 
 
Lenin argues that Marxism, like any political science, must change in 
accordance with the changing political situation. Accordingly, he is willing to 
say that ‘Engels was not infallible. Marx was not infallible’, for some of their 
ideas had been made antiquated by historical developments (CW 35: 269; 
CW 20: 433; CW 35: 272). It is for this reason that Lenin warns against 
uncritically relying upon the classics for contemporary political solutions, as 
‘only hopeless pedants could set about solving the peculiar and complex 
problems arising merely by quoting this or that opinion of Marx about a 
different historical epoch’ (CW 3: 33). 
 
One of Lenin’s biggest criticisms of the pre-revolutionary period was that large 
sections of the population had interpreted Marxism too dogmatically, and they 
therefore failed to understand the necessity of theoretical development. They 
had ‘assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and mutilated 
fashion. They had learnt by rote certain “slogans”, certain answers to tactical 
questions, without having understood the Marxist criteria for these answers’ 
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(CW 17: 42-3). Whilst Lenin thought that the Bolshevik political programme 
had been vindicated in practice by revolutionary developments, he also 
acknowledged that these developments produced some unexpected and 
surprising results: ‘Things have worked out differently; they are more original, 
more peculiar, more variegated than anyone could have expected’ (CW 24: 
44). Thus he rejoiced at the novel results of the revolution, which was 
‘developing in scope and depth with such splendid rapidity, with such a 
wonderful variety of changing forms, with such an instructive practical 
refutation of all doctrinarism’ (CW 31: 104). A positive consequence of this 
period, in Lenin’s view, was that the refutation of political values compelled 
Marxists to update their old ideas, which had become out-dated: ‘The 
“revaluation of all values” in the various spheres of social life led to a 
“revision” of the most abstract and general philosophical fundamentals of 
Marxism’ (CW 17: 42-43).  
 
It was not only during the pre-revolutionary period that Lenin expressed a 
fallibilist conception of Marxist political science. In his view, this fallibilism 
posed particular challenges for the construction of socialism long after the 
communist party had consolidated its rule. The main problem was that whilst 
there had been various bourgeois revolutions before, there had been no 
socialist revolutions, and as such, there were no textbooks to refer to. History 
was being made, and mistakes were therefore inevitable. He thus states that 
the problem of organisation ‘will inevitably entail a vast number of 
experiments, a vast number of steps, a vast number of alterations, a vast 
number of difficulties…because we have no experience of this’ (CW 27: 410-
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11). Accordingly, in the course of outlining the founding principles of scientific 
socialism in The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, 
Lenin reaffirms the constantly changing character of Marxist theory in both the 
philosophical and social spheres: ‘the history of philosophy and the history of 
social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 
“sectarianism” in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified 
doctrine’ (CW 19: 23).  
 
Lenin criticises all dogmatic Marxists who ‘ignore or overlook’ the fact that the 
political programme of scientific socialism needs to be modified in accordance 
with the changing material conditions. In the first place, he chastises the ‘old 
Bolsheviks’, who ‘played so regrettable a role in the history of our Party by 
reiterating formulas senselessly learned by rote instead of studying the 
specific features of the new and living reality’ (CW 24: 44).  
 
Lenin also criticises the Left Communists, who themselves attacked the 
Bolsheviks for their temporary participation in the Russian parliament. In the 
view of the Left Communists, it is a timeless principle that Marxist parties 
should never engage in parliamentary politics when capitalism is breaking 
down. Lenin rejects this position by arguing that there are no eternal truths in 
politics. All principles must change in accordance with the changing historical 
conditions of each particular country. Thus in “Left-Wing” Communism: an 
Infantile Disorder Lenin reminds the leftists that ‘any truth, if “overdone” (as 
Dietzgen Senior put it), if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its 
actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to 
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become an absurdity under these conditions’ (CW 31: 62). 
 
It is the orthodox Marxists of the Second International, however, who receive 
the brunt of Lenin’s criticism. For although they ‘fully appreciated the need for 
flexible tactics’, and whilst he believes their teachings on dialectics ‘will always 
remain a valuable contribution to socialist literature’, they ‘proved to be so 
undialectical in practice, so incapable of taking into account the rapid change 
of forms and the rapid acquisition of new content by the old forms’. ‘The 
principal reason for their bankruptcy’, in Lenin’s view, was that they were 
‘hypnotised by a definite form of growth of the working-class movement and 
socialism, forgot all about the one-sidedness of that form’, and ‘were afraid to 
see the break-up which objective conditions made inevitable’. Due to their 
refusal to acknowledge the theoretical changes made necessary by historical 
development, the orthodox Marxists ‘continued to repeat simple and, at first 
glance, incontestable axioms that had been learned by rote, like: “three is 
more than two”’. In doing so, Lenin argues that they underestimated the 
problems involved in obtaining certain knowledge in the political sphere, for 
‘politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, and still more like higher than 
elementary mathematics’. Thus he argues that ‘all the old forms of the 
socialist movement have acquired a new content’, and whilst ‘a new symbol, 
the “minus” sign, has appeared in front of all the figures’, the orthodox 
Marxists ‘stubbornly continued (and still continue) to persuade themselves 
and others that “minus three” is more than “minus two”’ (CW 31: 102). 
 
By showing that even the exact natural sciences are fallible, and by then 
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highlighting the unique epistemological challenges that face the social 
sciences, Lenin seeks to undermine dogmatic tendencies within political 
discussion, and to instead replace this dogmatism with a rational and critical 
analysis. Lenin’s defence of scientific socialism therefore rejects epistemic 
certainty and the forms of intellectual orthodoxy that it fosters. His fallibilist 
conception of science serves a democratic purpose. 
IV. Socialism: utopian and scientific  	
The central theme of Lenin’s philosophy of science is its explicit rejection of 
the dogmatic and orthodox tendencies in political discussion that other 
Marxists represented. The central purpose of Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism is to reject epistemic certainty and its consequent theoretical 
orthodoxy. In this respect it is worth noting that Lenin’s rejection of utopian 
socialism should not be seen as a straightforward repudiation of their views, 
for he argues that ‘Utopian socialism was right from the point of view of world 
history (CW 18: 358). Their fantastical visions of the future socialist society 
gave the infant proletariat hope during a time when there was none. This hope 
was crucial in motivating the workers, and in aiding their transformation into a 
revolutionary force. Thus whilst Lenin (CW 18: 358; CW 22: 304) admires the 
founders of utopian socialism, Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, he reserves 
most of his praise for the Russian Utopian Chernyshevsky. He even named 
his most infamous work after Chernyshevsky’s novel What is to be Done?, 
which is primarily a piece of socialist and feminist utopianism. The female 
protagonist creates an advanced cooperative workshop, reminiscent of the 
work of Robert Owen (who was an important influence on Chernyshevsky), 
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and in a series of dreams, has visions of a better world which bear the distinct 
hallmark of Fourier.  
 
Chernyshevsky was, for Lenin, ‘a utopian socialist, who dreamed of a 
transition to socialism through the old, semi-feudal peasant village commune’, 
and which ‘owing to the backwardness of Russian life, was unable to rise to 
the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels’ (CW 17: 123; CW 
14: 361). However, like Marx and Engels with their utopian predecessors, 
Lenin does not conceal the enthusiasm he feels for his. In the first place, 
Lenin commends ‘the greatest exponent of utopian socialism in Russia…a 
materialist’, for his critique of tsarist society. Chernyshevsky was a ‘consistent 
and militant democrat, his writings breathing the spirit of the class 
struggle…He was a remarkably profound critic of capitalism despite his 
utopian socialism’ (CW 20: 246). 
 
In the second place, Lenin commends Chernyshevsky for his ‘brilliant 
predictions’ concerning the development of Russia and his rejection of an 
inflexible, dogmatic politics (CW 2: 481; CW 20: 118; CW 14: 360). 
Chernyshevsky did not believe that objective truths could be discovered in the 
sphere of political science, and as such, he argued that politics would always 
be characterised by a plurality of opinions. It is for this reason that Lenin 
employs an aphorism of Chernyshevsky’s against the dogmatism of the 
Second International: 
Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action, said Marx and Engels. 
The greatest blunder, the greatest crime, committed by such “out-and-
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out” Marxists as Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, etc., is that they have not 
understood this and have been unable to apply it at crucial moments of 
the proletarian revolution. “Political activity is not like the pavement of 
Nevsky Prospekt” (the well-kept, broad and level pavement of the 
perfectly straight principal thoroughfare of St. Petersburg), N. G. 
Chernyshevsky, the great Russian socialist of the pre-Marxist period, 
used to say (CW 31: 71). 
It is therefore no surprise that Lenin’s greatest defence of dreaming bears the 
title of Chernyshevsky’s utopian novel. In What is to be Done? Lenin supports 
the value of dreaming as an integral part of the working class struggle. After 
outlining what he considers to be the best way forward for the movement, he 
concludes by saying ‘that is what we should dream of!’ He then approvingly 
quotes the Russian literary critic Pisarev, another admirer of Chernyshevsky, 
who argues that dreaming is an integral component of the human condition. 
According to Pisarev, dreams that have no chance of ever being realised are 
necessary for any political programme, for it is precisely these unrealistic 
dreams that motivate people to undertake momentous tasks: 
 My dream may run ahead of the natural march of events or may fly off 
at a tangent in a direction in which no natural march of events will ever 
proceed. In the first case my dream will not cause any harm; it may 
even support and augment the energy of the working men.... if man 
were completely deprived of the ability to dream in this way, if he could 
not from time to time run ahead and mentally conceive, in an entire and 
completed picture, the product to which his hands are only just 
beginning to lend shape, then I cannot at all imagine what stimulus 
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there would be to induce man to undertake and complete extensive 
and strenuous work in the sphere of art, science, and practical 
endeavour (CW 5: 509-10). 
 
In conclusion, Lenin pits this positive assessment of dreaming against 
revisionist and economistic ‘realism’. ‘Of this kind of dreaming there is 
unfortunately too little in our movement. And the people most responsible for 
this are those who boast of their sober views, their “closeness” to the 
“concrete”’(CW 5: 510). This defence of utopianism can be found not only in 
Lenin’s early works. In his Philosophical Notebooks, in the course of 
discussing the role of fantasy in idealist thought, Lenin asserts the value of 
fantasy in science: ‘It would be stupid to deny the role of fantasy, even in the 
strictest science: cf Pisarev on useful dreaming, as an impulse to work, and 
on empty-day dreaming’ (CW 38: 371). For Lenin, fantasy, and by extension, 
a democratic inquiry into the good life is in Marxism as of right.  
 
Lenin’s defence of scientific socialism is based upon a fallibilist conception of 
science, which defends a spirit of toleration in political debate. In opposition to 
the claims that Marxism works according to eternal truths, Lenin provides a 
revisable and open philosophy of science. Lenin’s defence of scientific 
socialism opposes dogmatism and encourages the maintenance of open 
discussion amongst Marxists.  
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Conclusion 
 
One of the great myths about Lenin’s philosophical thought is that his theory 
of scientific socialism is committed to epistemic certainty. It is commonly 
thought that Leninism enforced a rigid theoretical orthodoxy upon the 
international socialist movement that closed down the avenues of democratic 
deliberation. This chapter has shown that this claim has no textual or 
philosophical basis. Lenin’s fallibilist account of science explicitly rejects the 
possibility of obtaining certain knowledge. This fallibilism resides at the core of 
the text that is often accused of prompting the decline of Marxism into 
dogmatism, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Lenin’s conviction that 
Marxism is a science means that Marxism itself is incomplete and conjectural. 
It does not provide certain, infallible knowledge. Leninism therefore affirms the 
democratic condition of epistemic uncertainty. 
 
One of the reasons for both the democratic left’s widespread abandonment of 
Leninism, as well as the generally anti-scientific tenor of the socialist 
movement, is the erroneous conflation of science with scientism, the doctrine 
that only the natural sciences provide valid knowledge, and that all ethical, 
intentional and philosophical statements should be rejected. Both critics and 
supporters of Leninism do not sufficiently distinguish between scientistic and 
scientific socialism. Lenin’s theory of socialism is scientific. It is based upon 
an analysis of social relations and economic structures that adhere to the 
principles of rational enquiry exhibited in the natural sciences. Scientistic 
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socialism dismisses the validity of democratic debate and the rational 
discussion of values. It asserts that socialism requires no moral or ethical 
commitment. The scientistic conception of socialism is, like all other kinds of 
scientism, incompatible with democracy (O’Neill 1996: 64). Unfortunately, on 
rare occasions Lenin does show an opposition to excessive ethical and moral 
commitments, which can be interpreted in a scientistic fashion. Furthermore, 
by silencing entire modes of intentional and ethical discourse on the grounds 
that they are illegitimate, scientism can generate a dogmatic outlook. It can 
lead to the proposition that society should be run according to the dictates of 
science, and that the institutions and values of democracy should be 
disregarded. Lenin’s fallibilist account of science should not, however, be 
conflated with scientism. All criticisms of scientistic trends in socialism can 
and must be separated from evaluations of Leninism. 
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Chapter 4: Leninism, scientific socialism, and political 
equality 
 
Introduction 	
A second generally accepted condition for democratic decision-making is 
political equality. In its broadest philosophical sense, political equality means 
that all people are viewed to be intrinsically equal, and that they are treated 
with the same degree of respect. In its application to government, political 
equality means that every adult citizen should be considered to be sufficiently 
well qualified to participate in the democratic process of governing the state. It 
also means that in the decision making process, the government must give 
equal consideration to the interests of every person bound by those decisions 
(Dahl 1998: 76, 79).			
In his book chapter ‘A Philosophy of Certainty: Dialectical Materialism’, 
Harding argues that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism violates political 
equality. It does so by creating an epistemic distinction between the Marxian 
intellectuals who understand the scientific laws of history, and the rest of 
society, who lack this knowledge. Leninism advocates the dictatorship of an 
intellectual elite, during both the revolutionary upheaval and the subsequent 
construction of socialism. Harding divides his argument into two parts: 
 
(i) Leninism believes that only the few can understand science, as it 
necessitates a high level of education, knowledge and expertise. Lenin views 
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Marxism to be a science, and he therefore argues that it can only be 
understood by a few intellectual experts.   
 
(ii) Lenin defines science by its ability to predict and control events. 
Accordingly, just as just as natural science grants control over nature, 
scientific socialism grants control over society. Political questions are no 
longer discussed through democratic deliberation. They instead become 
technical questions that attempt to scientifically establish the policies that can 
most efficiently achieve the chosen aims of society. Accordingly, If Leninism 
views Marxism as a scientific theory, then in the interests of maximising 
efficiency, politics would be governed by applying that science.   
 
Given Lenin’s first assumption, that science can only be understood by the 
educated few, and his second assumption, that science grants control over 
events, he supposedly argued that in order to maximise efficiency, society 
had to be governed by the elite intellectual experts who alone understood the 
classical scientific socialism of Marx and Engels. Harding’s critique constitutes 
the latest reiteration of the now common claim, that Lenin’s positivist 
conception of science, like all positivist theories, necessarily reduces political 
issues to technical problems of efficiency, and the dictatorship of scientific 
policy experts. 
 
Section one of this chapter outlines Harding’s claim that in Leninism only the 
educated few can understand science. Section two rejects this claim by 
arguing that Lenin views Marxism to be a proletarian science. According to 
4281783	
	 86	
this theory, the workers will educate and emancipate themselves. Section 
three outlines Harding’s second claim, that Lenin’s conception of science 
grants control over events. Section four rejects this claim by arguing that not 
all predicative scientific theories grant control over the events that they 
predict. Determinist scientific theories predict events without allowing control 
over them. Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is determinist in this sense.  
I. Lenin’s intellectual elitism 
 
According to Harding’s interpretation, Lenin views Marxism to be a scientific 
theory of the highest order. Attaining mastery over a science requires rigorous 
theoretical training, education, and study. This is something that the masses 
can never achieve, for they are ‘restricted to the narrow confines of 
unreflective and undemonstratable subjective knowledge’ (Harding 1996: 238-
9). Lenin supposedly believes that only a select group of intellectual experts 
understand scientific socialism, and only they therefore possess the 
necessary knowledge that is required to rule over society: 
 
Lenin, in both his political and philosophical writings, was clear that the 
vehicle of science cannot be the proletariat. Only the intelligentsia that 
has undergone an arduous apprenticeship in philosophical practice 
was capable of acquiring and extending objective or scientific 
knowledge (Harding 1996: 238-9). 
 
Harding argues that the vessel of the Marxist intellectuals is the vanguard 
party, which, by virtue of its scientific knowledge, is the sole legitimate source 
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of political initiative. The party knows the real interests of society not because 
a popular majority agrees that it does, but because the party claims to have 
scientifically discovered these interests (Harding 1996: 173). The Leninist 
conviction that a group of intellectuals know the community’s interests, needs 
and desires better than the community itself thereby forms the philosophical 
basis of a one party dictatorship over society (Harding 1996: 174). These 
consequences, Harding argues, logically follow from Lenin’s conviction that 
scientific socialism can be understood only by an intellectual expert elite: ‘Few 
other ideologies so clearly and overtly credit the discourse of intellectuals on 
the grounds that they articulate a moment of truth beyond the grasp of 
ordinary people, as Leninism does, and in doing so’, Harding argues, ‘it 
confers on its theoretical leaders a crucial and unchallengeable authority…this 
is an ideology created wholly by intellectuals and…not only by them, but for 
them and in their interests’ (Harding 1996: 239). 
 
When Lenin asserted that the proletariat could at best attain a trade union-
consciousness, and that it therefore needed to be directed by the vanguard 
party, he was simply confronting the anti-democratic consequences of 
scientific socialism. Leninism therefore violates the political equality of 
participants in the process of revolutionary change (Harding 1996: 172-4):  
 
For Leninism neither the goals of the movement, nor the means 
appropriate to their realisation, could be advanced by opinion polls or 
the results of election ballots. As with almost all schemes of thought 
that distinguished between the wavering and insubstantial opinions of 
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the mass, and the positive, demonstrable knowledge of trained 
initiates, it was not merely agnostic but actually hostile to democratic 
procedures (Harding 1996: 275). 
 
Harding is not the only scholar to claim that Leninism creates an epistemic 
distinction between intellectuals and workers. According to Kolakowski, 
Leninism confronts the truism that ‘no workingman could have written Capital 
or Anti-Duhring or even What is to be Done?’. Scientific socialism was created 
by intellectuals and can only be understood by intellectuals. It follows from this 
that Lenin’s ideal society would be ruled by these intellectuals (Kolakowski 
1978: 667). 
 
In his book Marxism and Democracy Femia argues that the Leninist party, 
armed with its objective scientific knowledge, can ‘postulate the workers’ 
‘objective’ interests without testing their opinion’ (Femia 1993: 125). Femia 
gives the example of a passenger airline in order to illustrate this argument. 
No one thinks that plane pilots should subject their questions of navigation to 
the democratic scrutiny of the passengers. These are ‘technical’ questions 
that can only be adequately tackled by those who have, through the right 
education and intense study, attained the appropriate knowledge. Femia 
(1993: 126) argues that Lenin is so ‘captivated by this view of morality as a 
science, with ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers’, that he and other ‘Marxist 
scientists…set themselves up as arbiters of ‘objective truth- not only about 
how we do actually behave but also about how we ought to behave’. In this 
sense, Femia identifies the roots of Lenin’s elitism in the ideas of Plato, who 
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argued that where objective truths can be understood by the few, there is no 
need for democratic deliberation. In the same way as Plato’s philosopher 
Kings, Lenin believes that the revolutionary scientists can discover the real 
interests of the ignorant mass. He concludes his argument by stating that ‘the 
staples of liberal democracy-competitive elections, majority rule, freedom of 
expression-would seem to serve little purpose if the monolithic general will, or 
the people’s interests can be objectively defined by a scientific elite’ (Femia 
1993: 126-7). 
 
In the view of Graham (1986: 223-227), Leninism should be understood as an 
extreme form of elite theory. Both Lenin and the elite theorists believe that the 
majority are stupid, that they do not know what is in their best interests, and 
that they therefore need to be directed by an enlightened minority. However, 
wheras some of the elite theorists advocate a minimalist procedural 
democracy, Lenin seeks to institute a new set of non-democratic social 
relations. For these reasons, Graham (1986: 228) argues that ‘the points of 
divergence between elite theory and Leninism are not flattering to Leninism. It 
not only has objectionable features in common with elite theory: it has highly 
objectionable peculiarly its own’. 
 
It is not only liberals and conservatives who ascribe to Lenin the belief that 
only intellectual experts can understand scientific socialism. This argument 
has its origins in the currents of Left Communism, Western Marxism, and the 
Frankfurt school. The Left Communist Pannekoek argues that Materialism 
and Empirio-Criticism defends ‘middle class materialism’, which is, as its 
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name suggests, a philosophy that is intended not for the workers, but for 
middle class intellectuals. Lenin’s philosophy therefore serves the sole 
purpose of legitimising the rule of an intellectual elite. ‘The fighting working 
class…will find Lenin’s philosophical work a stumbling-block in its way, as the 
theory of a class that tries to perpetuate its serfdom’ (Pannekoek 1971: 108). 
Mattick, another Left Communist, also believes that Lenin distrusts the 
masses, who can never obtain a revolutionary consciousness. Leninism 
instead argues that this consciousness must be ‘‘imposed’ on the masses by 
the revolutionary party, which gets its ideas from the intellectuals’ (Mattick 
1935: 1-5). 
 
The arguments of the Left Communists are echoed by the Frankfurt school 
theorist Marcuse (1971: 32), who in his book Soviet Marxism, argues that 
Lenin’s intellectual elitism is the direct cause of Stalinist totalitarianism: ‘a 
straight road seems to lead from Lenin's "consciousness from without" and his 
notion of the centralized authoritarian party to Stalin's personal dictatorship’ 
(Marcuse 1971: 145). In agreement, the open Marxist Holloway (2002: 128) 
argues that Lenin carries the scientific conception of Marxism to its logical, 
anti-democratic conclusion when by arguing that the privileged party can 
bestow their scientific knowledge to the workers from on high.  
 
Harding’s interpretation is also one that he shares with some of Lenin’s most 
prominent supporters writing within the Leninist tradition. According to the 
influential interpretation of Leninism developed by the progenitor of Western 
Marxism, Georg Lukacs, class-consciousness ‘by no means develops with 
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fatalistic inevitability from its economic situation’ (Lukacs 1972: 31). In a 
manner similar to Rousseau, Lukacs argues that Lenin distinguishes between 
‘empirical consciousness’ which is the workers general preferences, and true 
or ‘imputed’ consciousness, which is ‘the appropriate and rational reactions 
“imputed” to a particular typical position in the process of production’ (Lukacs 
1971: 51). If the workers are rational, then they will develop this ‘imputed’ 
consciousness. They will view Marxism to be the most rational and 
appropriate worldview to their class situation. However, Lukacs does not think 
that the workers are rational. He argues that they are brainwashed by 
capitalist ideology, which means that most of them only posses an empirical 
consciousness, which is false, and illusory. Lukacs (1972: 27) argues that the 
correct ‘imputed’ consciousness must be brought to the workers from without, 
by the party that is ‘the tangible embodiment of proletarian class-
consciousness’. Lukacs (1972: 35) grants the vanguard party the privilege of 
knowing in advance when the revolution will arrive, the correct course to take, 
as well as the correct party line. As Femia (1993: 120-21) points out, Lukacs 
fails to contemplate the implications that this interpretation has for political 
equality, which means that attempt to defend ‘his Russian hero’ only 
reinforces Lenin’s scientific elitism. 
 
Harding argues then, that Leninism violates the democratic condition of 
political equality because it makes an epistemic distinction between the 
intellectuals who understand science, and the rest of society, who lack this 
knowledge. The following section argues that this argument has no textual 
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basis. Lenin rejects the charge that only an educated minority can gain 
scientific knowledge, for he views Marxism to be a proletarian science. 
II. Marxism as a proletarian science 	
Lenin distinguishes between two types of scientific knowledge: class-
consciousness and theory. Lenin believes that the growth of a revolutionary 
class-consciousness is a necessary condition for the socialist transformation, 
and that theory can aid in the development of this consciousness. However, 
Lenin not only rejects the idea that intellectuals alone can develop either kind 
of scientific knowledge. He argues that the workers are in a stronger position 
to develop both kinds of knowledge. 	
The development of class-consciousness 
 
In classical Marxist theory a person possesses a revolutionary class-
consciousness if they recognise that socialism is both possible and 
necessary, and that the socialist revolution is their task (Schmitt 1987: 145). 
Where then, does Lenin think this consciousness comes from? He does not 
think that it develops independently of the objective conditions, for one of 
Lenin’s main objectives in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism is to reject the 
idealist notion that ideas existed prior to, and independent of, the material 
world. He instead argues for the exact opposite proposition: ‘consciousness in 
general reflects being- that is a general principle of all materialism’ (CW 14: 
323). A foundational tenet of scientific socialism, in Lenin’s view, is that the 
economic base of society determines the political and ideological 
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superstructure. Thus, in his article Karl Marx, he states that all ideas ‘stem 
from the condition of the material forces of production’ (CW 21: 57), and in 
The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism he states that: 
 
Just as man’s knowledge reflects nature (i.e. developing matter), which 
exists independently of him, so man’s social knowledge (i.e. the 
various views and doctrines- philosophical, religious, political, and so 
forth) reflects the economic system of society (CW 19: 25). 
 
Lenin’s thesis that ideas originate in the ‘economic system of society’ means 
that ideas have no causal power if they are independent of the economic 
base, and in particular, the class struggle. This in turn denies the causal 
power of intellectuals as the bearers of such ideas. (The proposition that ideas 
have no causal power is one of the features that distinguishes Marxism from 
classical positivism). The growth of class-consciousness is not the product of 
the ‘right education’, but of the economic base of society. This subordination 
of ideas to objective economic processes has the political effect of denying 
any epistemic inequality between workers and intellectuals. Lenin argues that 
class-consciousness develops solely through the class struggle, the 
spontaneous activities that the working classes themselves organise and 
participate in. It is not introduced to the workers ‘from without’. The working 
class will educate and liberate itself: 
 
We do not expect the proletariat to mature for power in an atmosphere 
of cajoling and persuasion, in a school of merely sermons or didactic 
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declamations, but in the school of life and struggle…The proletariat 
must do its learning in the struggle, and stubborn, desperate struggle in 
earnest is the only teacher (CW 26: 402-3). 
 
Lenin’s (CW 31: 27) argues that the class struggle teaches ‘the fundamentals 
of political science’ to the working class more rapidly and profoundly than 
years of theoretical education. Revolutionary developments fostered by this 
struggle will rouse the workers from their individual apathy and concern with 
their own particular problems. It will confront them with the coercive power of 
reaction that will teach them the truths of Marxism much better than theory. 
The workers will arrive at a revolutionary consciousness in and through their 
immediate activity, and not through abstract theory. In Lenin’s view, ‘socialist 
dreams turned into the socialist struggle of the millions only when Marx’s 
scientific socialism had linked up the urge for change with the struggle of a 
definite class. Outside the class struggle’, Lenin argues, ‘socialism is either a 
hollow phrase or a naïve dream’ (CW 9: 443). 
 
Thus, to fill out the story just told in more detail, in his successive drafts of the 
Russian Social Democratic programme, written in 1895-97, Lenin develops a 
detailed account of the growth of proletarian class-consciousness. He argues 
that this process follows a dialectical pattern, which is intrinsic to the events 
the workers participate in. Within each phase of the class struggle, two 
antagonistic forces are in contestation. On the one hand, the proletariat 
attempt to achieve higher pay, more control over their work and better 
conditions, whilst on the other hand, the capitalists try to maximise their profits 
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by denying these demands. Each successive phase intensifies and clears up 
the issues involved, whilst strengthening the organisational structure and 
consciousness of the two opposing classes: ‘As this class struggle develops, 
class consciousness and solidarity will inevitably grow in the ranks of the 
revolution and in the ranks of the reaction, and sharper and more ruthless 
forms of struggle will be adopted’ (CW 11: 185). The transition from one 
phase to the next is dictated by the objective economic development of 
capitalism. 
 
During the first phase of the struggle, the phase of ‘agitation’ Lenin argues 
that capitalism is relatively underdeveloped. The class lines are not clear, and 
as such, the workers will have only a hazy understanding of their economic 
position and interests. They may lash out against their employers with random 
and uncoordinated acts of vandalism, but will not know what or whom to aim 
their anger at. Their collective organisations will be similarly local, disjointed, 
and weak. As the productive forces develop, however, and as the capitalist 
relations of production become more defined, the class antagonism between 
capital and labour will become clear for all to see. As a result of this economic 
change, the workers will come to understand the meaning and nature of their 
‘exploitation’. They will ‘learn from this struggle, firstly, how to recognise and 
to examine one by one the methods of capitalist exploitation, to compare them 
with the law, with their living conditions, and with the interests of the capitalist 
class’. It is through this struggle that the workers will recognise their 
exploitation to be an intrinsic feature of the capitalist mode of production. The 
workers will therefore gain a basic Marxist understanding of the functioning of 
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capitalism in and through their own experience: ‘By examining the different 
forms and cases of exploitation, the workers learn to understand the social 
system based upon the exploitation of labour by capital’ (CW 2: 113). 
 
During the second phase of development, which Lenin calls the phase of 
‘industrial action’, capitalism matures further, the rate of exploitation 
increases, and the class divisions become more explicit. The growth of 
industrial capitalism will concentrate the workers into factories, thereby giving 
them easy lines of communication. It is in these factories that the workers will 
discuss and compare their experiences of exploitation, and it is for this reason 
that the material conditions of the working class provide the ideal conditions 
for the development of Marxist ideas (CW 2: 103). The concentration of the 
workers into working units, combined with their miserable living conditions, will 
compel them to conduct more regular and organised struggles against their 
employers, in the form of strikes. In Lenin’s view, ‘strikes, which arise out of 
the very nature of capitalist society…signify the beginning of the working class 
struggle against the system of society’ (CW 3: 204). He believes that 
‘proletarians schooled in numerous strikes (to take only this manifestation of 
the class struggle)… assimilate in admiral fashion the very profound truth 
(philosophical, historical, political and psychological) expounded by Engels’ 
(CW 31: 67). By developing a sense of purpose and collective class solidarity 
amongst the workers, ‘every strike brings the thoughts of socialism very 
forcibly to the workers mind, thoughts of the struggle of the entire working 
class for emancipation from the oppression of capital’ (CW 4: 314). 
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The third and penultimate phase of the development of class-consciousness 
that Lenin outlines is the ‘political struggle’, which ‘develops the workers 
political consciousness’ (CW 2: 113). During this phase, the increasing 
economic disparities between the workers and capitalists will intensity the 
class lines, and the workers will conduct larger and more violent strikes on a 
more frequent basis. As this turmoil begins to threaten the profit margins of 
the monopolies and the economic stability of society more generally, the 
capitalist state will begin to view the strike movement as a threat to its own 
existence. In order to maintain its economic and political interests the state 
will try to crush working class industrial action wherever it arises. As each 
successive strike and factory clash ‘necessarily brings the workers into 
conflict with the laws and representatives of state authority’, the class struggle 
‘automatically and inevitably spurs the workers on to think of state, political 
questions, questions of how the Russian state is governed, how laws and 
regulations are issued, and whose interests they serve’ (CW 2: 113). Thus as 
the direct result of their ‘struggle against the factory owners for their daily 
needs’, the workers will come to recognise the interdependence of economic 
and political power under capitalism, which is another fundamental proposition 
of Marxism (CW 2: 113). 
 
In the process of demanding better conditions, Lenin argues that the workers 
will become aware of their lack of political freedom under capitalism. Since 
their demands will be opposed by the state and proscribed by law, their 
attempts at economic amelioration will be hampered by political and legal 
constraints. As the workers are harassed and repressed for trying to obtain 
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the basis necessities of life, they will realise that the civil and political rights 
that they possess under capitalism are in fact insufficient, for none of these 
rights extend into the economic sphere of the workplace. They will realise that 
as long as they lack collective democratic ownership over the means of 
production, and so long as they are consistently misrepresented in 
government by the bourgeoisie, all talk of human rights and democracy will 
remain just that. They will realise that as long as they lack political power, the 
various laws of the state will be written by the capitalist class, and in the 
interests of the capitalist class. As a result, ‘the political movement of the 
working class will inevitably lead the workers to realise that their only salvation 
lies in socialism’ (CW 2: 22). The workers will come to recognise that the 
political struggle is, by necessary extension, a revolutionary struggle, which is 
the final stage of the process. Thus, Lenin concludes, ‘the struggle of the 
factory workers against the employers inevitably turns into a struggle against 
the entire capitalist class, against the entire social order based upon the 
exploitation of labour by capital’ (CW 2: 107).  
 
Lenin’s account of the growth of class-consciousness rejects the notion that 
theoretical study is a necessary condition for this growth. In his view, the 
capacity of any person to develop this consciousness depends not upon their 
level of theoretical expertise, but upon their position within the economic base, 
and more specifically, the class struggle. As the working class suffer 
exploitation on a direct and daily basis, they are, according to Lenin, in the 
strongest position to develop a revolutionary class-consciousness: ‘it is, in 
fact, the disgraceful economic condition of the proletariat that drives it 
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irresistibly forward and compels it to fight for its ultimate emancipation. And 
the fighting proletariat will help itself’ (CW 2: 22). By the same reasoning, he 
argues that intellectuals, by virtue of their bourgeois economic position, are 
actually at a disadvantage when compared to the workers. Indeed, 
Intellectuals are more likely to develop a reactionary bourgeois 
consciousness, rather than a revolutionary consciousness. Lenin was 
therefore not surprises when he observed that the spontaneous working class 
movement in Russia was outstripping the growth and cohesion of the 
intellectual revolutionary organisations. In What is to be Done, the text that is 
so often accused of criticising spontaneity, Lenin repeatedly points out that 
‘the strength of the present day movement lies in the awakening of the 
masses…and that its weakness lies in the lack of consciousness and initiative 
among the revolutionary leaders’ (CW 5: 373). 
 
In Leninism the principal force that develops revolutionary class-
consciousness is the class struggle. Lenin argues that the proletariat will 
educate, liberate, and govern itself. As revolutionary class-consciousness 
grows out of the collective experiences of the workers, rather than the ‘correct’ 
education, Leninism rejects the notion that only intellectuals can gain this type 
of scientific knowledge. 
 
Theoretical Knowledge 
 
The second type of scientific knowledge that Lenin identifies is theoretical. In 
the Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, he states that the 
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theory of scientific socialism constitutes the culmination and unique synthesis 
of three classical social sciences: ‘German philosophy, English political 
economy and French socialism’ (CW 19: 23-4). These sciences can be 
assimilated only through acquiring knowledge of historical materialism, 
Marxian economic theory, and the materialist dialectic, in addition to the 
history of the modern labour movement and modern social revolutions. For 
Lenin, the notion that this colossal sum of theoretical knowledge can 
spontaneously emerge from the class struggle is absurd. Marxist theory is not 
the inevitable product of the class struggle and class experience, but the 
result of theoretical, scientific production. It is for this reason that ‘the theory of 
socialism…grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories 
elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by 
intellectuals.’ Lenin also recognises that ‘by their social status the founders of 
modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the 
bourgeois intelligentsia’ (CW 5: 375). 
 
The belief that the theory of scientific socialism originated in the minds of 
intellectuals does not mean, however, that this theory, once formed, can only 
be understood by one group of people rather than another. Lenin rejects the 
idea that only intellectuals can gain theoretical knowledge, for he argues that 
Marxism is not only a science, but a ‘proletarian science’ (CW 16: 205). In 
Lenin’s view, the works of classical scientific socialism were intended to be 
the theoretical expression of the proletarian class struggle. They sought to 
reflect, explain and anticipate the spontaneous working class movement. 
Lenin therefore argues that the working class are in a privileged position to 
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understand the works of Marx and Engels, because these works explain what 
the workers face on a daily basis. This is why he states that Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Anti-Duhring, and the Communist Manifesto are ‘handbooks for 
every class-conscious worker’ (CW 19: 24). Accordingly, in What is to be 
Done? Lenin states that ‘socialist theory reveals the causes of the misery of 
the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, 
and for that reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily’ (CW 5: 
386). In a letter to the working class leader Bebel he remarks that ‘the 
theoretical principles of Marxism have taken deepest root and spread most 
widely among the masses of the proletariat, illumining with radiant light their 
struggle for the complete overthrow of capitalism’ (CW 43: 232); and in his 
address to the Russian Young Communist League Lenin triumphantly 
proclaims that Marxist theory was no longer the privileged preserve of a sole 
intellectual, or even a party of intellectuals. It was now, in his view, being 
understood, utilised and developed by the global working class in their 
struggle to overthrow the existing order. It had truly become a proletarian 
science: 
 
Communist theory- the science of communism created in the main by 
Marx, this doctrine of Marxism—has ceased to be the work of a single 
socialist of the nineteenth century, even though he was a genius, and it 
has become the doctrine of millions and tens of millions of proletarians 
all over the world, who are applying it in their struggle against 
capitalism (CW 31: 286). 
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Not only does Lenin reject the belief that a lack of ‘right education’ prevents 
the workers from understanding Marxist theory. He argues that the workers 
are capable of producing theory themselves. Thus in one of his earliest works, 
What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-
Democrats, Lenin states that ‘when the doctrine of scientific socialism had 
definitely taken shape…there emerged numerous talented energetic 
disseminators of this doctrine among the working class’ (CW 1: 320).	 Lenin 
singles out the ‘advanced workers’ in particular, ‘who accept socialism 
consciously, and who even elaborate independent socialist theories’ (CW 4: 
280). Whilst Lenin thought that Russian intellectuals were ‘losing interest’ in 
Marxist literature, he noted that ‘an impassioned desire for knowledge and for 
socialism’ was ‘growing among the workers’. Despite the fact that these 
workers lived in squalid conditions, and although they were exploited on a 
daily basis, Lenin was impressed that they managed to ‘study, study study, 
and turn themselves into conscious Social-Democrats- “the working-class 
intelligentsia”’ (CW 4: 280-81). Lenin argues that ‘every viable working-class 
movement has brought to the fore such working-class leaders, its own 
Proudhons, Vaillants, Weitlings, and Bebels’ (CW 4: 280). He holds the tanner 
Joseph Dietzgen in particularly high regard, and he frequently counts him 
alongside Marx and Engels as a founder of scientific socialism: ‘In that 
worker-philosopher, who discovered dialectical materialism in his own way, 
there is much that is great!’ (CW 14: 139, 246-7). Lenin therefore urges 
socialists to make every effort to ensure that the numbers of the working class 
intellectuals are ‘regularly reinforced, that its lofty mental requirements are 
met and that leaders of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party come 
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from its ranks’ (CW 4: 280-81). 
 
Lenin does not believe that all workers are equally capable of developing 
theoretical knowledge. Below the ‘advanced workers’ are the substratum of 
‘average workers’, who ‘will not be able to get a full grasp of an intricate 
theoretical or practical problem.’ Lenin does not, however, conclude that the 
average workers are forever incapable of developing theoretical knowledge, 
for he argues that every effort should be made to ‘raise their level’ and 
promote them into the ranks of the advanced workers (CW 4: 281).  
 
Behind the average workers comes the ‘lower strata of the proletariat’, who 
may be unable to understand even a socialist newspaper, let alone a work of 
socialist theory. Yet again, however, Lenin does not condemn the lower strata 
to a state of permanent ignorance, for he argues that ‘different forms of 
agitation and propaganda must be brought to bear on these strata—
pamphlets written in more popular language, oral agitation…leaflets on local 
events…legal educational activities’ (CW 4: 282). Whilst Lenin therefore 
believes that some people are more capable of developing theoretical 
knowledge than others, he rejects the notion that some people are forever 
incapable of acquiring this knowledge. He instead believes that the main task 
of socialists should be to bring everyone up to the level of the intelligentsia. 
 
Whilst Lenin acknowledged that there were not enough working class 
theoreticians within the Russian socialist movement, he did not blame this 
shortage upon a lack of formal education on the workers part. He instead 
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argues that two obstacles prevented workers from accessing the relevant 
literature (CW 5: 384). In the first place, he argues that books were often too 
expensive for the workers, who could not afford them with their subsistence 
wages. After criticising the high price of the newly published four-volume 
collection of the Marx-Engels Correspondence, Lenin insisted that ‘a selection 
of passages most important from the standpoint of principle could and should 
have been published for wide distribution among workers’ (CW 19: 553). 
Lenin sought to overcome the price barrier by publishing the works of Marx 
and Engels in the form of cheap ‘penny publications’, which the workers could 
more easily access (CW 12: 104; CW 1: 186).   
 
In the second place, Lenin argues that the party intellectuals often denied the 
workers access to Marxist literature. Many Russian intellectuals believed that 
only they needed to understand theory, and that the workers could be directed 
through agitation. Lenin despised this mentality, as it had the effect of 
sustaining an artificial distinction between workers and intellectuals, a 
distinction that he sought to destroy. He argues that ‘the workers themselves 
wish to read and do read all that is written for the intelligentsia’. In his view, all 
they needed was the opportunity to do so: ‘only a few (bad) intellectuals 
believe that it is enough “for workers” to be told a few things about factory 
conditions and to have repeated to them over and over again what has long 
been known’ (CW 5: 384). 
 
Whilst Lenin believes that all people are capable of understanding theory and 
becoming theorists, he acknowledges that the acquisition of theoretical 
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knowledge is an individual enterprise that takes time and conscious effort. For 
this reason, he recognises that there will for a long time be a division of labour 
between a minority of communist intellectuals on the one hand, and a majority 
of class-consciousness workers on the other. The problem with this division is 
that some intellectuals may begin to think that they know better than the 
workers, and that they should therefore direct the socialist movement. The 
fact that many of these intellectuals may come from the working class does 
not by itself remove the danger of this epistemic distinction from being made. 
The potentially anti-democratic implications of this problem are not as bad as 
they seem, however, for whilst Lenin gives intellectuals an important role in 
the political process, he maintains that they can only serve as the educative 
auxiliary of the proletarian movement, rather than its governing element. 
Communist intellectuals should combine their theoretical knowledge of 
objective historical laws with a social and economic analysis of current affairs, 
in order to gauge the current political conditions and ascertain the 
potentialities for a socialist transformation. Lenin argues that this scientific 
knowledge should be used to guide the workers onto paths of activity that can 
more efficiently effect this transformation. This is, in his view, the role that 
Marx, the principal founder of scientific socialism, performed. ‘His attitude 
towards the heaven-storming proletariat was that of a practical adviser, of a 
participant in the struggle of the masses’ (CW 12: 110). It is for this reason 
that Lenin denounces all ‘petty-bourgeois ideologists’ who ‘seem to think they 
can manage the whole thing themselves’, and that the workers ‘need not 
worry’. These intellectuals ‘are reactionary…because they simply cannot 
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understand the necessity for a struggle, a desperate struggle of the working 
people themselves for their emancipation’ (CW 1: 286). 
 
It is also in these terms that Lenin defines the role of the vanguard party in 
relation to the working class movement in his most extended discussion of the 
problem, What is to be Done?. In this text, Lenin argues it is both inevitable 
and necessary that a party will join the militant proletariat and supply it with 
organisational, theoretical and educative elements (CW 5: 375). He insists, 
however, that the purpose of the party is not to crush the spontaneous 
working class, but to instead win it’s support. In the second place, he argues 
that the vanguard party must be a proletarian party, i.e. one that is governed 
and led by the workers themselves, and not some intellectual elite (CW 8: 
146, 196; CW 15: 290; CW 10: 32). Since, according to Lenin (CW 2: 27), the 
‘the emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself’, 
only the workers themselves can control and direct the party that will affect 
this transformation. Thus, in his article	 The Proletariat and the Bourgeois 
Democrats Lenin chastises the Russian intellectuals who thought that they 
alone should take control of the party and workers movement: 
 
Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true 
spokesmen of working-class aspirations, these gentlemen do not 
understand or do not want to understand that the working-class 
movement will achieve substantial results only if it…realises that its 
real emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of the 
bourgeois democrats…These ’strictly-speaking’ Social-Democrats, 
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alleged Marxists, ought to realise the demoralisation they are bringing 
among the working-class masses by seeking to prove that certain 
’democrats’ (but not Social-Democrats) consisting exclusively of 
bourgeois intellectuals are called upon to show the workers the way to 
freedom and socialism…only the power of the organised proletariat is 
capable of overthrowing autocratic tyranny and winning political 
freedom (CW 8: 229). 
 
Throughout Lenin’s writings on party organisation one can witness his 
constant struggle to alter the class composition of the party, from one that was 
dominated by the intelligentsia, to one that was dominated by the working 
class. Lenin argued that this could be best achieved by electing as many 
workers as possible into the principle organs of power, the party committees. 
Only this would allow the workers themselves to direct the party’s activities at 
the grassroots level, and thereby determine the course of the revolution. Thus 
during the Party’s Third Congress, in his speech ‘On the question of the 
relations between workers and intellectuals within the social-democratic 
organisations’, Lenin states that ‘I should be strongly in favour of having eight 
workers to every two intellectuals on our committees…If this clause 
constitutes a threat to the committees consisting of intellectuals, then I am all 
for it’. He then argues that ‘one cannot rely on a small periphery of 
intellectuals, but one can and should rely on hundreds of organised workers’ 
(CW 8: 408-15). In a later article, The Reorganisation of the Party Lenin is 
adamant that the ratio of workers to intellectuals in the party must be 
balanced even more in favour of the former: ‘now we must wish for the party 
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organizations to have one social-democratic intellectual to several hundred 
social-democratic workers’ (CW 10: 36). 
 
It is not only before the revolution that Lenin emphasises the importance of 
the working class educating and emancipating themselves through their 
spontaneous activity. He argues that the construction of socialism and the 
development of a socialist class-consciousness can proceed only upon the 
basis of this activity. In doing so, he rejects the ‘old, absurd, sentimental and 
vulgar intellectualist idea of “introducing socialism”’ from without’ (CW 26: 
401). Lenin argues that ‘these notions, to say nothing of the plans, are alien. 
We have always known, said and emphasised that socialism cannot be 
“introduced”, that it takes shape in the course of the most intense, the most 
acute class struggle’ (CW 26: 401). Under the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
Lenin argues that the working class will learn to govern themselves on the job, 
so to speak, by making mistakes and learning from them.	This is why Lenin 
coined the famous slogan ‘all power to the soviets’, as these were a form of 
democratic organisation that the Russian workers themselves created in their 
class struggle. A recurring theme in Lenin’s writings on socialism is his 
support of direct democracy and the rejection of intellectual leadership. Thus, 
in his article Can the Bosheviks Retain State Power? Lenin asks whether the 
transition to socialism can be achieved through any form of governance other 
than mass direct democracy: ‘Is there any way other than practice by which 
the people can learn to govern themselves and to avoid mistakes? Is there 
any way other than by proceeding immediately to genuine self-government by 
the people?’ His answer to these questions is no. ‘The chief thing now’, states 
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Lenin, ‘is to abandon the prejudiced bourgeois intellectualist view that only 
special officials, who by their very social position are entirely dependent upon 
capital, can administer the state’ (CW 26: 114). 
 
Whilst Lenin believes that intellectuals and trained experts are necessary in 
performing the more complex tasks of state administration, he argues that 
they should be closely supervised by the workers themselves. Their main role 
should be to enthuse the working class with the determination to carry out the 
difficult task of socialist construction, and to remove every obstacle that 
frustrates their self-activity. Intellectuals should seek to inspire and encourage 
the working masses to create and govern their own economic and political 
forms. Lenin rejects the idea that intellectuals should impose rules or enforce 
standards, norms or procedures for the workers to follow. He also rejects the 
idea that intellectuals, by virtue of their scientific knowledge, should be given 
political leadership: ‘One of the most important tasks today, if not the most 
important’, states Lenin, ‘is to develop this independent initiative of the 
workers, and of all the working and exploited people generally, develop it as 
widely as possible in creative organisational work’: 
 
At all costs we must break the old, absurd, savage, despicable and 
disgusting prejudice that only the so-called ‘upper classes’, only the 
rich and those who have gone through the school of the rich, are 
capable of administering the state and directing the organisational 
development of socialist society (CW 26: 409). 
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Lenin notes that the Russian masses often lacked the determination and 
confidence to create and direct their own activities under the new conditions, 
for they had been used to working as wage slaves for most of their lives. In 
his address to the Third Congress of the Soviets in 1918 he recalls a 
conversation he had with a delegation of peasants and workers, who asked 
him for help with regards to various organisational problems. Lenin did not 
offer an intellectual dictatorship as a solution. ‘I said to them: you are the 
power, do all you want to do…you will make mistakes but you will learn’ (CW 
26: 468). As for those intellectuals outside and within the party who claimed to 
know the correct path to socialism, Lenin told them to discard ‘the old shabby 
little book carefully stowed away under the pillow, the unwanted book that 
serves them as a guide and manual of implementing official socialism’. In his 
view, ‘the minds of tens of millions of those who are doing things create 
something infinitely loftier than the greatest genius can foresee’ (CW 26: 474). 
 
Looking back upon the construction of socialism During the Sixth Russia 
Congress of the Soviets, Lenin remarks that theoretical study and knowledge 
played a negligible role: ‘We cannot say that great sections of workers have 
laid the foundations in a politically-conscious way in the sense that they have 
taken to reading books and pamphlets.’ He goes on to say that ‘by political 
consciousness we mean that they have tackled this formidable task with their 
own hands and by their own efforts’. Whilst Lenin acknowledges that the 
workers made many errors in their attempts to govern themselves, he argues 
that ‘every blunder trained and steeled them in organising industrial 
administration’. Lenin concludes from this successful experiment in self 
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governance that ‘all workers…know that they themselves, with their own 
hands, are building socialism and have already laid its foundations, and no 
force in the country can prevent them from seeing the job through’ (CW 28: 
140). 
 
If there is a textual basis for the charge that Leninism violates political 
equality, it is not Harding’s claim that Lenin trusts intellectuals over the 
workers. On the contrary, it is because Lenin trusts the workers over 
intellectuals. A cursory glance at Lenin’s writings shows that whilst his 
descriptions of the proletariat are mostly complimentary and positive, his 
descriptions of intellectuals are consistently derogatory and negative. This 
negativity stemmed from the fact that the majority of intellectuals in Russia 
were also members of the bourgeoisie, which meant that their commitment to 
socialism was ambiguous. The following analysis shows that Lenin took an 
increasingly negative attitude towards intellectuals as revolutionary events 
developed. 
 
In his works written during the pre-revolutionary period Lenin expresses the 
view that intellectuals are crucial component of the revolutionary movement. 
He did, however, find it necessary to criticise what he viewed to be the 
inherent characteristics of the ‘intellectual personality’. Thus in One step 
Forward Two Steps Back Lenin criticises the ‘instability and wishy-washiness 
of the intellectual’ (CW 7: 324), in his article on the Victory of Cadets and 
Tasks of the Workers’ Party, he speaks of ‘the garrulous, boastful, smug, 
narrow-minded, craven bourgeois intellectual’ (CW 10: 221), and in The 
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Election Results in St Petersburg he speaks of ‘the spinelessness and political 
short-sightedness, characteristic of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals’ (CW 12: 
121).  
 
As the revolutionary movement began to develop, however, and as the class 
divisions within Russia became more explicit, Lenin started to argue that all 
ideas were either proletarian or capitalist in nature. There was no middle 
ground. He therefore started to believe that intellectuals, by virtue of their 
bourgeois class position, were inherently reactionary in the ideological sphere. 
This belief is clearly expressed In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, where 
Lenin states that not a single professor can be ‘trusted one iota’ when it 
comes to philosophy or the general theory of political economy: ‘Taken as a 
whole, the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the 
capitalist class, while the professors of philosophy are learned salesmen of 
the theologians’ (CW 14: 342-3).  
 
Lenin’s skepticism regarding the personalities and ideas of intellectuals 
caused him to question their commitment to the socialist cause. Whilst he still 
thought that some intellectuals could become devoted revolutionaries within 
the working class movement, he also believed that their class position made 
them sympathetic to the capitalists. Thus in The Last Word of Russian 
Liberalism he states that  ‘by the very nature of the case the bourgeois 
intellectual vacillates between placing hopes in the masses and placing hopes 
in the Octobrist Bourgeoisie’ (CW 16: 136). He expresses the same sentiment 
in the the introduction to his pamphlet Two Parties, where he observes that 
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whilst bourgeois intellectuals were ‘joining the proletariat group after group… 
group after group has again deserted the proletariat, having found out through 
experience that they cannot live up to revolutionary Marxism’ (CW 17: 226). 
 
Lenin’s attitude towards intellectuals became increasingly negative and 
intolerant as time went on, however, as in his view, intellectuals such as 
Kautsky and Bernstein had betrayed the working class movement with their 
opportunism and revisionism. Instead of supporting the revolutionary 
overthrow of their governments they sought a compromise with capital. 
Kautsky’s betrayal in particular supported Lenin’s already growing conviction 
that intellectuals could not be trusted to aid the construction of socialism in 
post-revolutionary Russia. Thus in his article How to Organise Competition, 
he calls for a ‘war to the death against the rich and their hangers-on, the 
bourgeois Intellectuals…All of them are of the same brood- the spawn of 
capitalism, the offspring of aristocratic and bourgeois society’ (CW 26: 411). 
He goes on to state that:  
 
This slovenliness, this carelessness, untidiness, unpunctuality, nervous 
haste, the inclination to substitute discussion for action, talk for work, 
the inclination to undertake everything under the sun without finishing 
anything, are characteristics of the “educated”’ (CW 26: 411).  
 
Lenin then argues that many of the ‘mistakes, shortcomings and defects’ of 
the revolution were the direct result of the ‘deplorable…characteristics of the 
intellectuals in our midst, and to the lack of sufficient supervision by the 
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workers over the organisational work of the intellectuals’ (CW 26: 412). In 
order to solve this problem Lenin calls upon the workers to overcome their 
‘timidity’ and exercise their collective power over the intellectuals in the 
workplace. 
 
As the fledgling soviet state struggled to survive the opening months of 1918 
Lenin began to see intellectuals not only as poor Marxists, but as enemies of 
the people. During his Speech Delivered at the First all-Russia Congress of 
International Teachers, looking back upon the role of intellectuals during the 
events leading up to 1918, Lenin concluded that ‘the majority of the 
intellectuals of the old Russia	were downright opponents of the Soviet regime’ 
(CW 27: 445). At the Fourth Conference of Trade Unions Lenin wrote that the 
intellectuals working within Russia were sabotaging the construction of 
socialism: ‘the intelligentsia are using their experience and knowledge…in the 
service of the exploiters, and are doing all they can to prevent our gaining 
victory over the exploiters’ (CW 27: 475). In a Moscow Party Workers’ 
Meeting in November of 1918 Lenin expressed his belief that intellectuals 
were of little value in comparison to the workers (CW 28: 214). He repeats this 
sentiment during the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of 
Workers and Red Army Deputies. Here Lenin tells his proletarian comrades 
that ‘we must rely upon the masses of the workers and not count upon the 
intellectuals who, although they have come to work for us, have a large 
number of useless people among them’ (CW 29: 259). In a later article, The 
Great Beginning, Lenin appears to reject the value of intellectuals entirely: 
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‘Not with the assistance of the intellectuals will the proletariat achieve victory, 
but in spite of their opposition’ (CW 29: 424-25).  
 
Lenin’s opposition to intellectuals reaches its peak in his article On the 
Significance of Militant Materialism, where he emphasises the importance of 
combatting the ‘philosophical prejudices of so-called educated Society’. He 
argues that ‘Dietzgen senior…aptly and clearly expressed the fundamental 
Marxist view’ of the intellectual philosophers in the capitalist countries, when 
he stated that ‘the professors of philosophy in modern society are in the 
majority of cases nothing but “graduated flunkeys of clericalism”’ (CW 33: 
228).  
 
Although there is clearly much evidence to show that Lenin distrusted 
intellectuals, it would be wrong to go further and describe his thought as a 
form of anti-intellectualism. That is, it would be wrong to suggest that Lenin 
rejects the value of education, philosophy, art, literature and science. For in 
the first place, Lenin acknowledges the fact that the founders of scientific 
socialism, Marx and Engels, were themselves intellectuals. It has also been 
shown that Lenin rejoiced at the increasing numbers of working class 
intellectuals in Russia, and that he took active steps to both increase their 
numbers and ensure that they took charge of the socialist movement. In his 
letter to his friend and writer Maxim Gorky, who was himself an intellectual, 
Lenin states that he does not oppose intellectualism per se, for ‘It is wrong to 
confuse the “intellectual forces” of the people with the “forces” of bourgeois 
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intellectuals’. Lenin then makes it clear that he supports the former and 
opposes the latter: 
 
The intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing and 
gaining strength in the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and its 
henchmen, the intellectual lackeys of capital, who imagine they are the 
brains of the nation. Actually, they are not the brains, but shit (CW 44: 
284). 
 
Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is therefore not a form of anti-
intellectualism, but a form of workerism, in the sense that it supports the self-
emancipation of the working class. Lenin is less concerned with opposing 
intellectuals than he is with giving all workers the opportunity to become 
intellectuals. This aspect of his thought militates against any kind of elitism in 
his writings. 
 
Lenin views Marxism to be a proletarian science, for the principal reason that 
it represents the proletariat, and because it’s intended audience is the 
proletariat. Lenin therefore rejects the first element of Harding’s claim, that 
only an intellectual elite can understand scientific socialism. In doing so, he 
specifically rejects the notion that there is an epistemic inequality amongst 
political participants. 
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III. Lenin’s positivism 
 
The second element of Harding’s argument is that that Lenin’s theory of 
scientific socialism claims to grant control over events. Dialectical materialism, 
in Harding’s view, ‘is a philosophy that consistently maintains that all 
phenomena of the natural and social words are knowable and that they 
conform, in their evolution and development, to knowable laws’ (Harding 
1996: 228-9, 13). Lenin supposedly believes that explanation and prediction 
are symmetrical, in the sense that every explanation can in principle function 
as a prediction, and vice versa. To explain a phenomenon is to cite the causal 
antecedents required to produce or prevent it: ‘The scientific understanding of 
society meant the formulation of laws of development with predictive power.’ 
Accordingly, ‘to know science was to know the future, or, at the least, to have 
a prescient awareness of what was coming into being’ (Harding 1996: 239). 
 
Lenin supposedly argues that the ability to predict events grants the ability to 
control these events, for knowledge, understood as the knowledge of causes 
and effects, is power. Accordingly, in the same way as knowledge of the 
natural sciences provides the means to control the natural environment, so 
too does the knowledge gained from social science allow control over the 
social environment. Just as natural science grants enormous power, which is 
based on knowledge of how the natural world functions, so too does scientific 
socialism allow a degree of control over the social arrangements which 
structure peoples lives. Lenin and his followers created a ‘new universal 
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explanatory system’ that transformed ‘materialism into a metaphysic and the 
dialectic into an invariable set of scientific ‘laws’. Armed with such weapons, 
communists could storm any fortress, overcome every obstacle’ (Harding 
1996: 237).  
 
Harding (1996: 239) argues that ‘the practical consequence of this stance is 
fairly obvious’. Political questions and debates would be reduced to technical 
questions that seek to discover the most efficient ways of achieving pre-
chosen goals. The governance of society would no longer require democratic 
debate and deliberation over policy, as the answers to all political questions 
can be discovered and answered with the precision of natural science. When 
productive efficiency has been maximised in order to guarantee the optimal 
return, and when technology has advanced to the point where scarcity is a 
thing of the past, ‘politics as disputation and politics as envy about the 
disputation of scare resources would wither away. Less politics, as Lenin put 
it, would be the best politics’. In Harding’s (1996: 275) view, ‘the displacement 
and emasculation of politics in Leninism and the whole Leninist tradition 
is…directly attributable to its fixation with an outmoded metaphysic of 
science’.  
 
Harding argues that it is not the workers who are to govern this scientifically 
administered society, for if Lenin’s assumption that science grants control 
over events is combined with his first assumption, that only intellectual experts 
can understand science, it becomes clear that Leninism advocates the 
dictatorship of a scientific intellectual elite. Only intellectuals are able to lead 
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because they alone are ‘blessed with thorough knowledge of the laws of 
development’. Only they therefore ‘have privileged access to the truth’ 
(Harding 1996: 239, 241). 
 
In Harding’s view, Lenin’s belief that scientific socialism grants control over 
events is to blame for Stalin’s supposed voluntarism, which believed that the 
human will is the dominant factor in the universe. The Communist party under 
Stalin therefore thought that it could use its scientific knowledge to accomplish 
any political objective it chose to set itself. No task was too difficult, and no 
aim was too high. Anything was possible as long as all the relevant social, 
political and economic variables were manipulated in the correct way. Harding 
argues that the totalitarian excesses of Stalin’s five-year plans in the Soviet 
Union are therefore founded upon Lenin’s scientific pronouncements: ‘The 
dialectic became…an apologetic for Stalin’s ruthless voluntarism in forcing a 
recalcitrant reality to dress by the requirements of thought’. As a result, 
‘dialectics became a ‘science of sciences’, fated to walk hand in hand with 
socialism as planned economy and planned society, and the party leadership 
was, of course, its oracle’ (Harding 1996: 237). For these reasons Harding 
(1996: 275) concludes that Leninism is ‘hostile, not only to democracy, but 
also to politics; and science was to be the antidote to both.’ 
 
As with Harding’s other criticisms of Leninism, this particular charge has its 
origins in the Marxist tradition. The Left Communist Pannekoek argues that 
Lenin’s ‘middle class materialism’, when combined with his belief that science 
grants control, justifies the rule of a scientific intellectual elite, who will rule the 
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country as one large economic enterprise. In Pannekoek’s view, Lenin’s 
determination to realise the ‘well-ordered organisation of production for use 
under the direction of technical and scientific experts’ spelled the death of 
democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in post-revolutionary Russia 
(Pannekoek 1971: 107, 100). 
 
Harding’s argument is one that he also shares with those who identify the 
positivist character of Lenin’s philosophy. These accounts argue that that 
Lenin’s positivism, like any positivist social science, necessarily transforms 
political questions and democratic procedures into technical questions and the 
dictatorship of scientific experts (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer 1978: 45-6; 
Santamaria and Manville 1976: 79-96; Fay 1975: 25, 102; Jordan 1967: 358-
9). The proponents of this view blame the degeneration of the Russian 
revolution upon Lenin’s positivism, which enforced the methods of capitalist 
industrial technique and management upon the political and economic 
system. Even Liebman (1975: 338), who provides one of the most 
sympathetic interpretations of Lenin’s political thought, argues that ‘there was 
positivism indeed in a conception of economic progress and labour relations 
that was strictly dependent on considerations of output, order and efficiency’. 
Polan puts forward the same argument in his book Lenin and the End of 
Politics, which draws upon Habermas’ critique of instrumental rationality in 
order to criticise Lenin’s positivist politics. According to Polan, the principle of 
instrumental rationality encourages political actors to utilise the most efficient 
means to achieve their chosen goals. The problem with this approach, in 
Polan’s view, is that the most efficient means can sometimes contradict the 
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end goal in question. Polan argues that Lenin’s positivism is committed to a 
technocratic society because it views expert rule to be the most efficient 
means of obtaining communism. The fact that the political inequalities 
inherent to the technocratic system contradict the values of communism is 
therefore unproblematic according to Lenin’s logic, as the end justifies the 
means. In his bid to achieve the most efficient and rationally organised 
society, Polan argues that Lenin’s positivism entails not just the end of 
democracy, but ‘the end of politics’ (1984: 91, 109-122). 
 
The technocratic implications of Lenin’s positivism have not only been 
explored in political theory. The Russian author Yevgeny Zamyatin vividly 
anticipates these implications in his dystopian novel We (1972), which he 
wrote partially in response to political developments taking place within 
Leninist Russia. The novel describes a world of harmony and conformity 
within a united totalitarian state. Society is governed according to the scientific 
principles of Taylorism, a theory of management that analyses and 
synthesizes workflows. The main objective of Taylorism is the maximisation of 
economic efficiency, and in particular, the productivity of labour.  
 
Harding and other commentators point out that in the later years of his rule, 
Lenin increasingly drew upon the insights of Taylorism in order to increase the 
efficiency of production and economic organisation within the Soviet Union 
(Harding 1996: 275; Liebman 1975: 338; Traub 1978: 82-92). In these 
accounts, Lenin’s belief that the laws governing society can and should be 
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directed by an intellectual elite necessarily lends itself to the bleak 
technocratic society that Zamyatin describes.  
IV. Lenin’s determinism  
 
The association of Leninism with the positivist belief that science grants 
control over events has no textual basis. Some scientific theories predict 
events without granting the power to control them. Prominent examples 
include seismological and astronomical theories. These theories can be called 
determinist. Lenin’s conception of scientific socialism is a determinist theory. It 
argues that the development of society is driven by the growth of the 
productive forces. The level of development of the productive forces 
determines the social relations between classes, otherwise known as the 
relations of production. The productive forces and relations of production 
together constitute the economic base of society. This economic base 
determines the ideological and political superstructure. A fundamental point of 
scientific socialism, in Lenin’s (CW 1: 159) view, is that these causal 
antecedents cannot be consciously controlled: ‘Determinism…postulates that 
human acts are necessitated and rejects the absurd tale about free will.’ Lenin 
therefore rejects the notion that societies can be shaped in any fashion by 
those who are in power. Politics is the arena of the superstructure, and the 
human activity in this sphere is constrained by the economic base: 
 
Marx put an end to the view of society being a mechanical aggregation 
of individuals which allows all sorts of modification at the will of the 
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authorities (or, if you like, at the will of society and the government) and 
which emerges and changes casually (CW 1: 142). 
 
Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism also claims to identify and explain 
features that are intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production, such as its 
volatile cycle of periodic economic crises and the maintenance of a ‘reserve 
army of labour’. By analysing these features it is able to predict future long-
term trends, which include the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the 
concentration of capital, and the gradual immiseration of the working class, 
which are developments that establish the necessary pre-conditions for the 
collapse of capitalism. Lenin argues that these events and developments 
cannot however, be consciously controlled. As both a theory of historical 
change and capitalist development, Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is 
determinist. It predicts what will happen in the future, but it does not grant the 
power to control these events. This subordination of the subjective human will 
to the objective laws of economic development is what distinguishes scientific 
socialism from utopian socialism. The utopian socialists thought that it was 
possible to bring about socialism by creating elaborate blueprints and by then 
putting them into practice. In Lenin’s view, scientific socialism rejects the 
notion that people can implement any kind of society they want whenever they 
wish it. He argues that the rise and fall of a mode of production is an objective 
process that takes place independently of the human will. Thus, whilst ‘Marx 
is concerned with one thing only: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the 
necessity of the given order of social relations’, he also, ‘proves the necessity 
of another order which must inevitably grow out of the preceding one 
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regardless of whether men believe in it or not, whether they are conscious of it 
or not’: 
 
Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, 
governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness 
and intentions, but, rather, on the contrary, determining the will, 
consciousness and intentions of men (CW 1: 166). 
 
Lenin’s determinism is informed by an Aristotelian teleology, which describes 
things in terms of their purpose, principle, or end goal. Aristotle (1924: 9-17) 
claimed that an acorn's intrinsic telos is to become an oak tree. This means 
that acorns, if given the proper conditions for growth, will always grow into oak 
trees. They can take only one path of development, and there is only one 
possible end form. In a similar manner, Lenin’s determinism is committed to a 
teleological view of capitalist development, in which capitalist society passes 
through a series of predetermined stages, culminating in communism. Each 
successive phase is unavoidable in the sense that it necessarily unravels and 
prepares the elements of the next phase. Although it is human beings who 
carry out this process, their motivations and actions are determined by 
objective economic factors that are beyond their individual control. 
 
Lenin’s teleological determinism informs the arguments of his three chief 
works that chart the development of capitalism into socialism and 
communism. In the first of these texts, The Development of Capitalism in 
Russia, Lenin rejects the populist belief that it is possible to skip past 
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capitalism and build socialism straight away, for this is prohibited by the 
objective laws of history. He instead argues that the transition to socialism will 
be made only once capitalism has progressed through its usury, merchant, 
manufacturing and industrial stages of development. In the second of these 
works, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin argues that the 
final stage has arrived, and that the transition to socialism is therefore 
immanent, for he states that ‘Capitalism in its imperialist stage drags the 
capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social 
order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete 
socialisation’ (CW 22: 205). Finally, in the State and Revolution Lenin rejects 
the notion that it is possible to achieve fully-fledged communism straight 
away. He instead argues that all countries will first pass through a ‘lower’ 
socialist phase, which is necessary in order to develop the productive forces. 
It is only once socialism provides material abundance that the inevitable 
transition to the ‘higher’ phase of communism will be made. The main point of 
this teleological account is that the development of society is a phasal process 
that cannot be controlled.		Thus Lenin concludes that	‘the idea that knowledge 
can “create” universal forms, replace the primeval chaos by order… is the 
idea of idealist philosophy’, as in his view, ‘the world is matter moving in 
conformity to law, and our knowledge, being the highest product of nature, is 
in a position only to reflect this conformity to law’ (CW 14: 169). Whilst it is 
possible to understand the laws governing the development of society, this 
knowledge does not grant the ability to control these laws.	
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Of course, the fact that a theory is determinist does not mean that the theory 
is unable to make any recommendations to the various actors involved. On 
the contrary, many determinist theories make recommendations. For instance, 
weather forecasts warn people about the weather, in order that they may take 
necessary precautions. People cannot control the weather, but they can 
control the impact that it has upon them. Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism 
is a determinist theory of this kind. It predicts the fall of capitalism, and 
encourages forms of political activity that will smooth the process. This is what 
Marx (1954: 20) means when he states that it is both possible and desirable 
to ‘shorten and lessen the birth-pangs’ associated with the next phase of 
historical development.  Indeed, a central tenet of Marxism more generally is 
the unity of theory and practice. Theory is only useful in so far as it aids 
political practice.  
 
Lenin’s belief that people can and should actively intervene in the objective 
development of history is an important distinction between Leninism and the 
orthodox Marxism of the second international (Stalin 1953: 83).  Kautsky, the 
chief theoretical proponent of orthodox Marxism, promised that the future 
arrival of socialism was inevitable. He said nothing, however, about what was 
to be done. Kautsky’s fatalist account of progress entailed a quietist politics. In 
effect, this meant that the revolutionary proletariat could do nothing except 
wait for the inexorable developments within the underlying economic structure 
to deliver the revolutionary transformation (Lichtheim 1961: 259-78).  
Socialism would eventually fall into the workers hands like a ripe apple from a 
tree, and it would require no conscious action on their part.  
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Lenin’s determinism is not fatalist in the sense that he thinks socialism will 
arrive without any conscious activity. Lenin (CW 21: 71) does argue that ‘Marx 
deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialist 
society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the development of 
contemporary society’. However, he does not believe that the collapse of 
capitalism inevitably leads straight to socialism. It instead presents a choice: 
‘either we go back to supreme rule by the capitalists, or forward towards real 
democracy, towards majority decisions’ (CW 27: 365). Lenin argues that the 
realisation of socialism requires the revolutionary action of the working class 
(CW 1: 420). If the workers do not participate in the class struggle, then they 
will not be able to successfully take advantage of the opportunities given to 
them by the objective conditions. The inevitable arrival of socialism will take 
much longer, and involve more unnecessary suffering. Lenin’s emphasis on 
the importance of the working class struggle, and on the developments in 
consciousness that this struggle fosters, defines his arguments with the 
orthodox Marxists, Mensheviks, and economists. It is highlighted in the 
debates over the role of the party in which his differences with Kautsky are 
distinct. This aspect of Lenin’s thought militates against the quietist politics 
that Kautsky’s orthodox Marxism promotes. Lenin explicitly rejects that 
position: ‘Far from assuming fatalism, determinism in fact provides a basis for 
reasonable action’ (CW 1: 420). 
 
However, whilst Lenin’s promotion of the class struggle rejects the passive 
fatalism of the second international, the political activism he advocates 
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remains determinist. Lenin argues that the workers can arrive at a 
revolutionary class-consciousness only through their self-activity in the class 
struggle, which cannot be directed by intellectuals (Stalin 1953: 85; CW 9: 52; 
CW 5: 25; CW 41: 419). Thus whilst he argues that ‘our revolution is the great 
Russian revolution precisely because it has roused vast masses of the people 
to participation in making history’, he maintains that ‘It is not within our power 
either to direct the masses or restrain them to any great extent’. Lenin does, 
however, believe that intellectuals should attempt to anticipate the path of 
events. They ‘can, after studying the actual situation and the relations 
between classes, foresee the inevitable trend of their historic activities, the 
main forms of their movement’. He also argues that that intellectuals should 
use this scientific knowledge to augment the spontaneous working class, by 
informing them, aiding their struggle, and by readying them for the impending 
revolution. They should try their best to ‘enlighten the masses and prepare 
them for forms of the movement which, though imperceptible to the superficial 
observer… inexorably follow from the whole economic and political situation in 
the country’ (CW 10: 507). 
 
Due to his insistence that the workers will educate themselves through their 
own struggle, Lenin argues that this struggle cannot not be wilfully directed by 
the party. This also means that if the workers make bad decisions, then the 
revolutionary party has to make these bad decisions with them. Lenin’s 
determinist emphasis on the independence of the working class movement 
compels Marxists to support their activities even when they know beforehand 
that these activities will not be successful. It was Lenin’s determinism that led 
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to his exile following the disastrous July days uprising, an event that he 
thought would fail, but which he refused to explicitly oppose. 
 
Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism rejects the positivist assumption that 
science grants the ability to control the events that it predicts. It gives advice 
as to where people should build their homes, but it does not grant the power 
to prevent an earthquake. It is this determinism that prevents the theory from 
being abused by a scientific intellectual elite. It militates precisely against the 
forms of voluntarism that Leninism is often accused of introducing to the 
socialist movement. 
 
In this respect it is worth noting that one of Lenin’s main objectives in 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism is to combat the positivist tendencies 
encroaching upon Marxism. He argues that ‘to drag in’ the ideas of Comte, ‘is 
absurd’, for he points out Marx ‘contemptuously brushed Comtean “positivism” 
aside’ (CW 14: 337). Lenin believes that ‘Marxism rejects not what 
distinguishes one positivist from another, but what they have in common and 
what makes a philosopher a positivist instead of a materialist’ he goes on to 
argue that the ‘essence of the matter is the radical difference between 
materialism and the broad current of positivism, which includes Auguste 
Comte’ (CW 14: 205). These definitive statements make it clear that Lenin’s 
philosophy of science has nothing to do with positivism. The proper criticisms 
of positivistic currents in socialism can and should therefore be kept distinct 
from criticisms of Leninism. 
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The notion that Lenin was infatuated with Taylorist forms of scientific 
management and production is also a myth, for he wrote only two short 
articles on the Taylor system, comprising three pages in total. Due to the fact 
that Lenin’s works constitute forty-five volumes, these two sources hardly 
prove his obsession with Taylorist forms of scientific management. In the 
second place, Lenin always took a critical view of Taylorism, which he saw to 
be an essentially capitalist invention. In his first article on the subject, A 
“Scientific” System of Sweating, Lenin criticises Taylorism for being anti-
democratic, stating that ‘It is not the democratic institutions that the European 
bourgeoisie is borrowing from America, nor political liberty, nor yet the 
republican political system, but the latest methods of exploiting the workers’ 
(CW 19: 594). He then reiterates this criticism in his second article on the 
subject, The Taylor System—Man’s Enslavement by the Machine, where he 
states that the increases in efficiency achieved under Taylorism are 
‘introduced to the detriment of the workers, for they lead to their still greater 
oppression and exploitation’ (CW 20: 153).  
 
After the revolution, however, Lenin does take a less dismissive view of the 
Taylor system in his article The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government. 
One of the more convincing explanations for Lenin’s change of perspective 
during this period is provided by Liebman, (1975: 338) who suggests that the 
severity of the social and economic crisis in post revolutionary Russia, as well 
as the urgency of the problems that needed to be solved, limited the range of 
political solutions. The objective conditions did not encourage experimentation 
with labour techniques that were diametrically opposed to those laid down by 
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industrial capitalism. Liebman and Harding are mistaken, however, in arguing 
that Lenin desired the wholesale adoption of Taylorism, for he maintained his 
original view that it many of its features were inhumane: ‘the Taylor system, 
the last word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a 
combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of 
the greatest scientific achievements’ (CW 27: 259). Due to the fact that Lenin 
saw Taylorism as a form of capitalism, Lenin argued that socialists should not 
adopt it wholesale, but that they should instead apply only ‘what is scientific 
and progressive in the Taylor system’ (CW 27: 258). He called for the workers 
to combine the democratic form of socialist organisation with the benefits in 
productive efficiency that Taylorism granted: 
 
The Taylor system	 —without its initiators knowing or wishing it— is 
preparing the time when the proletariat will take over all social 
production and appoint its own workers’ committees for the purpose of 
properly distributing and rationalising all social labour (CW 20: 154). 
 
Lenin argues that science should be utilised in the service of political and 
economic democracy. He never suggests that the principles of science should 
actually govern human society. It is for this reason that Leninism has little in 
common with the Taylorist society outlined in Zamyatin’s dystopian novel.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism does not 
violate, but affirms the democratic condition of political equality. In the first 
place, Lenin rejects the notion that science can only be understood by an 
intellectual elite. He argues that revolutionary consciousness develops 
through the class struggles in capitalism. The working class will educate, 
emancipate and rule over itself.  
 
Lenin believes that Marxism is not only a science, but a proletarian science, in 
the sense that its targeted audience is the working class, and that it can be 
understood by the working class. Whilst Lenin argues that it is necessary for a 
party organisation to join the militant proletariat and supply it with 
organisational, theoretical and educative elements, he argues that it should 
not seek to suppress their spontaneous activity. Lenin also argues that the 
party must be controlled and directed by the workers themselves. This in turn 
denies any political inequality amongst people in the process of political 
change. 
 
Leninism also rejects the claim that scientific theories grant control over 
events. Lenin’s conception of scientific socialism is determinist theory. It 
predicts events, but does not grant control over them. Whilst Lenin’s political 
activism encourages revolutionaries to take part in the class struggle, he 
argues that revolutionaries should not and cannot determine the course of this 
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struggle. One of the great virtues of Lenin’s scientific socialism is its 
commitment to political equality. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examined Harding’s specific reiteration of the now common 
claim, that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is anti-democratic. It showed 
that this argument has been put forward not only by Lenin’s liberal critics, as it 
is also a major criticism of Leninism from within the currents of Russian 
Bolshevism, Left Communism, and Western Marxism. Harding’s arguments 
were rejected. It was shown that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is 
compatible with democratic practice, and supports a democratic conception of 
socialism. 
 
Chapter Three examined Harding’s claim that Lenin’s theory of scientific 
socialism violates epistemic uncertainty. According to Harding, Leninism 
violates this condition because it views Marxism as a monistic ‘philosophy of 
certainty’. Lenin claimed to have established absolute truths through the use 
of science, and he therefore tolerated no alternative conceptions of the world.  
 
Harding’s claim was shown to be false. In the first place, Lenin defends a 
fallibilist conception of science in the text that supposedly showcases the 
epistemic certainty of Leninism, Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Lenin 
recognises that scientific knowledge makes no claim to completeness, but 
keeps building upon, rearranging, reformulating and modifying its theories and 
generalisations as new problems emerge.  
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Secondly, Lenin’s fallibilist conception of philosophy argues that the 
propositions of dialectical materialism must be revised in accordance with new 
discoveries in the natural sciences. Lenin also highlights peculiar obstacles to 
certain knowledge in the social sciences that make then more fallible than the 
natural sciences. Lenin’s purpose in stressing the continuity of the natural and 
social sciences is to stress the particular fallibilism of politics, and Marxist 
politics in particular. 
 
It was then argued that Lenin’s attitude towards the utopian socialists can be 
misunderstood if it is interpreted as a total rejection of utopianism. Lenin 
admires the utopian socialists and their lasting impact upon Marxism. Lenin’s 
admiration for the Russian utopian Chernyshevsky promotes utopianism as 
remedy to dogmatic tendencies in Marxism. Lenin’s defence of dreaming in 
scientific socialism supports an open democratic enquiry into politics. 
 
Chapter one concluded by arguing that Lenin’s theory of scientific socialism is 
wrongly conflated with ‘scientistic’ socialism. This creates a choice between 
either a conception of socialism that is committed to democratic values such 
as epistemic uncertainty, or a conception of socialism that rejects the validity 
of democratic values all together. It was argued that this is a false choice that 
does not have to be made. Lenin’s fallibilist conception of science does not 
entail a scientistic outlook. It is compatible with the democratic principle of 
epistemic uncertainty.  
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Chapter Four examined Harding’s argument that Lenin’s theory of scientific 
socialism violates a second condition for democratic decision making- political 
equality. This argument consists of two core elements. The first is that Lenin 
saw Marxism as a science, and he therefore argued that it could therefore 
only be understood by a few experts. The second argument is that Lenin’s 
positivist conception of science grants the ability to control and manipulate 
events. Given both of these assumptions, Lenin argued that in order to 
maximise efficiency, society had to be governed by the elite intellectual 
experts who understood the laws of scientific socialism. 
 
Lenin rejects Harding’s first argument, that only the educated few can 
understand scientific socialism. Lenin’s materialist theory of ideology argues 
that human ideas are determined by the economic base of society, and in 
particular, the class struggle. This denies the causal power of ideas, which in 
turn rejects the monopoly that intellectuals have over these ideas. The 
political effect of this is to deny any epistemic inequality between participants 
in the political process. According to Lenin, class-consciousness develops 
through the class struggle in capitalism. The workers will educate, liberate, 
and govern themselves. 
 
In the second place Lenin views Marxism to be a proletarian science, in the 
sense that it is the product of the class struggle, and that its intended 
audience is the working class. Lenin therefore believes that the workers are in 
a special position to understand Marx’s theories. This in turn denies any 
political inequality amongst people in the revolutionary process. 
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Lenin also rejects Harding’s second argument, that scientific socialism grants 
control over events. Lenin’s determinist interpretation of scientific socialism 
predicts events without granting control over them. Whilst Lenin’s emphasis 
on the importance of the class struggle rejects the quietist politics that 
Kautsky’s passive fatalism encourages, the activist politics that Lenin 
promotes remains determinist. The party can only aid the working class, 
rather than attempt to coerce it. It is this determinism that prevents scientific 
socialism from being abused by a revolutionary scientific elite.  
 
Leninism, which views Marxism to be a science, is not anti-democratic. It does 
not violate, but affirms epistemic uncertainty and political equality. If the 
socialist movement of the twentieth century did in fact decline into dogmatism 
and dictatorship, then this decline cannot be attributed to Lenin’s theory of 
scientific socialism. 
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